The tougher nuts for prosecutors to crack will be Maduro’s arguments that he’s entitled to some kind of immunity—whether because he was Venezuela’s “head of state” or because, even if he wasn’t, his alleged crimes all arise from official acts conducted with governmental authority. Both of these doctrines are common-law doctrines that federal courts apply with at least some reference to executive branch practice.

On head-of-state immunity, there’s no doubt that, as one district court put it in 1994, “A head-of-state recognized by the United States government is absolutely immune from personal jurisdiction in United States courts unless that immunity has been waived by statute or by the foreign government recognized by the United States.” The issue here is recognition. Unlike Noriega in Panama (who was at most the de facto head of state), Maduro lawfully served as interim president after Hugo Chávez’s 2013 death; and he was formally recognized as the Venezuelan head of state for years—by both the Obama and Trump administrations—after his 2013 election. It’s only since 2019, after serious concerns arose regarding the integrity of the 2018 Venezuelan elections, that the United States has refused to recognize Maduro as the lawful head of state—in a context in which, unlike what was true for Noriega, Maduro would have at least some claim that he was lawfully serving in that position under Venezuelan law. In other words, Maduro was, for quite some time, recognized as Venezuela’s head of state. And even during the period in which he wasn’t, he has at least a plausible claim that he was nevertheless entitled to immunity. Either way, that question seems much closer here than in the Noriega case (or others).

And even if courts ultimately reject head-of-state immunity, they may still conclude that Maduro is insulated from liability for “official acts,” especially in light of the Supreme Court’s embrace of a version of constitutional “official act” immunity for President Trump in Trump v. United States. In its 2012 ruling in Yousuf v. Samantar, the Fourth Circuit carefully analyzed both of these immunity doctrines before holding that they did not apply to a high-ranking official in Somalia during the military regime of General Mohamed Barre. But there are lots of grounds on which Maduro’s arguments could well be stronger—including his higher status; the extent to which the acts he’s charged with are not as obviously violations of jus cogens norms of international law; and so on.

All of this is to say that the prosecution will be no slam dunk, especially with regard to the charges against Maduro himself. That may not matter in the grander scheme of things, but it’s yet another way in which Friday’s operation raises more questions than it answers.