ECONOMIC AND MEDIA WAR AGAINST SOCIALIST SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF US–CUBAN RELATIONS
Mark Ginsburg
International Journal of Cuban Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Winter 2022), pp. 272-308 (37 pages)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/48710326
Contribution from Pluto Journals

ECONOMIC AND MEDIA WAR AGAINST
SOCIALIST SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF
US–CUBAN RELATIONS
Mark Ginsburg1
University of Maryland

Abstract
This article examines the US’s use of sanctions or unilateral coercive measures
(economic war) and the US’s support for propaganda communicated through its own
organised mass media and the supposedly “independent,” corporate mass media as
well as through social media to instigate anti-government sentiment and action (media
war). The US’s economic war against Cuba began soon after Cuba’s 1959 revolution,
although the US’s hostile actions as well as desires and efforts to shape Cuban society
go back to the 19th century. This economic war has had tremendous negative impact
on Cuba’s economy and the daily life of Cubans. In terms of the media war, this article
focuses on how propaganda distributed through mass, corporate media as well as
social media, often paid for by the US government, was directed at misleading Cubans
and others, including those in the US, about the situation in Cuba. Such distortions were
designed to provoke alienation and anti-government action by Cubans in general and,
in more recent years, particular subgroups of artists, musicians, Afro-Cubans, and youth.
And while some successes can be noted (specifically the sparking and broadcasting of
protests on 11 July 2021), more generally the media war has failed in its goal of regime
change. The non-event of 15 November 2021 is a clear example of this.

. . .

DOI:10.13169/intejcubastud.14.2.0272
ECONOMIC AND MEDIA WAR AGAINST SOCIALIST SOCIETIES 273IJCS Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals www.plutojournals.com/ijcs/

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Economic War: Sanctions or Unilateral Coercive Measures

Since Cuba’s 1959 Revolution, US policies toward Cuba have been based on the
idea first articulated by Lestor Mallory, who in April 1960 wrote a US State
Department memo proposing that “every possible means should be undertaken
… to weaken the economic life of Cuba … [by] denying money and supplies to
Cuba … [in order] to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of
government” (Mallory 1960).10 This idea produced within the Eisenhower
Administration just over a year after Cuba’s Revolution appears to be one of the
inspirations for President Kennedy’s executive order in February 1962 (Chomsky
2010: x).11 The executive order stated in part that:

[T]he United States … is prepared to take all necessary actions to promote national
and hemispheric security by isolating the present Government of Cuba … Now,
therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America …
1. Hereby proclaim an embargo upon trade between the United States and Cuba
… 2. Hereby prohibit … the importation into the United States of all goods of
Cuban origin and all goods imported through Cuba

And LeoGrande (2022) reminds us that “a year later [Kennedy] invoked
the [1917] Trading with the Enemy Act to extend the embargo to prohibit all
transactions (trade, travel, and financial) unless licensed by the Secretary of the
Treasury (at the president’s direction).” The evolving set of economic sanctions
or, more appropriately, unilateral coercive measures, 13 by the US against
Cuba has been authorised by executive orders as well as federal laws (e.g. the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 14 the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1996, 15 the Trade Sanction Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000), but derive authority from the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917
(Flowers 2021; Kornbluh 2022; Kornbluh & Gelzer 2022; Lamrani 2013). 16 As
noted above, Kennedy’s initial executive order proclaims “an embargo upon
trade between the United States and Cuba,” 17 but has also been used to limit
travel to Cuba by US citizens (i.e. by restricting their spending money when in
Cuba). However, the embargo (or blockade), including the 243 measures imple-
mented by the Trump Administration, is viewed as violating international law
and has been condemned by the vast majority of countries at the UN 30 times,
in part because it is unilaterally imposed by the US and because it has been used
extraterritorially to restrict banking and other business activities of individuals,
organisations and companies based in other countries (Bolender 2013; Cabañas
2022; Telesur Staff 2021b; Yaffe 2021).18 Moreover, “a significant majority of
the US population would like to see the economic sanctions lifted and relations
with Cuba normalized” (Lamrani 2013: 14).

The impact on Cuba and its people has been extensive (Banks 2021). For
example, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Cuba, in his presentation to the United Nations General Assembly regarding
the resolution entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and
financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”, on
23 June 2021, commented:

In 2020, Cuba, like the rest of the world, had to face the extraordinary challenges
posed by the Covid-19 pandemic. The US government has made the virus an ally
in its ruthless unconventional warfare, deliberately and opportunistically
increased the economic, commercial, and financial blockade, and caused the
country record losses of about $5 billion.

President Donald Trump has applied 243 unilateral coercive measures to limit the
arrival of US travelers and harm tourist markets in third countries, he has taken
wartime measures to deprive us of our fuel supplies, he has hunted down the
health services that Cuba lends in many countries, it has intensified the
harassment of our country’s commercial and financial transactions with other
countries, and has … activat[ed] Title III of the [1996] Helms-Burton Act,19 to
intimidate foreign investors and commercial enterprises. …

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