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Rail Safety Megathread. Updated July 23, 2024
Last edited Tue Jul 23, 2024, 03:18 PM - Edit history (83)
This thread is for rail safety in general, as opposed to oil trains or crude by rail.
Previous updates: April 2, 2024; March 13, 2024: November 24, 2023; November 16, 2023; November 2, 2023; October 18, 2023; September 19, 2023; August 31, 2023; August 24, 2023; August 23, 2023; August 19, 2023; August 10, 2023; August 4, 2023; August 3, 2023; July 30, 2023; July 3, 2023; June 28, 2023; June 26, 2023; April 28, 2023; April 24, 2023; March 10, 2023; March 8, 2023; March 6, 2023; March 5, 2023; March 4, 2023; March 3, 2023; March 2, 2023; February 24, 2023; February 15, 2023; February 12, 2023; February 2, 2023; January 9, 2022; November 16, 2021; October 2, 2021; September 29, 2021; May 10, 2021; September 16, 2020; August 19, 2020; May 18, 2020, September 30, 2019; September 14, 2019; April 18, 2019; April 12, 2019; April 11, 2019; April 10, 2019; March 28, 2019; March 25, 2019; March 22, 2019; December 20, 2018; October 20, 2018; October 9, 2018; September 10, 2018; August 29, 2018; July 31, 2018; May 20, 2018; April 14, 2018, February 22, 2018; November 30, 2016; February 7, 2017; July 5, 2017; July 27, 2017; August 8, 2017; September 22, 2017; November 10, 2017; November 20, 2017; December 5, 2017; December 14, 2017; December 19, 2017; December 21, 2017; December 22, 2017; December 28, 2017; January 2, 2018; January 25, 2018.
Keywords: rail, railroad, railway, rail safety, rail worker, Amtrak, CSX, Burlington Northern Santa Fe, BNSF, Norfolk Southern, NS, Canadian Pacific, CP, Canadian National, CN, Kansas City Southern, KCS, PanAm, crossing, grade crossing, derail, derailment, Federal Railroad Administration, FRA, Ted Mann, Josh Funk, positive train control, PTC, National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB, MBTA, commuter, commuter rail, Keolis, OLI, Operation Lifesaver, brake, electro-pneumatic brake, electronically controlled pneumatic brake, ECP, EP brake, Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) braking, VRE, Virginia Railway Express, liquid natural gas, LNG, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, PHMSA, tank car, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, vinyl chloride, DOT 111, DOT 105, DOT 105J, wayside detector, wayside track detector, wayside machine vision detector, hot box detector, HBD, HBDs, in-train forces, train energy management system, (TEMS), distributed power unit, DPU, Precision Scheduled Railroading, (PSR), train makeup, train handling, very long train, (VLT), H503— Buffing or slack action excessive, train handling, FRA H504—Buffing or slack action excessive, train make-up, train handling, train makeup, buffing, slack action, Train Energy and Dynamics Simulator (TEDS), TOES™ and NUCARS® simulation, TOES™/STARCO™ modeling software, hazmat, hazardous material
111 replies
= new reply since forum marked as read
= new reply since forum marked as read
NTSB: We can’t know why SUV was on tracks before train crash
Originally published July 24, 2017 at 9:25 pm Updated July 25, 2017 at 5:51 pm
By COLLEEN LONG and JENNIFER PELTZ
The Associated Press
NEW YORK (AP) — Federal safety investigators said Tuesday they can’t determine why an SUV ended up in the path of an oncoming commuter train, causing a crash that killed six people at a rail crossing in suburban New York in 2015. ... Detailing the results of the nearly 2 1/2-year investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board suggested evaluating the safety risks at some rail crossings and said the design of the train’s power-providing third rail played a role in the toll of deaths and injuries in the crash in the community of Valhalla. The NTSB concluded the SUV driver’s actions were the probable cause of the wreck, but Chairman Robert Sumwalt said those actions remained a mystery.
....
Ellen Brody drove onto the tracks, and when the gate arm came down onto her SUV, she got out and inspected the vehicle before getting back in and driving further onto the tracks. The impact of the crash sparked an explosion, and flames blasted into the Metro-North train, burning out the first rail car and killing Brody and five people aboard the train. More than a dozen others were injured.
Brody wasn’t on the phone, impaired or fatigued, NTSB investigators found. They found all the signals were working properly; the train’s brakes worked and were pulled on time; the warning signs at the crossing worked and were properly marked; the train wasn’t speeding; the engineer wasn’t fatigued or distracted; the track wasn’t faulty; and the emergency exit windows worked. ... Sumwalt hypothesized that Brody wasn’t aware that she had driven into a railroad crossing while inching through traffic.
....
The power-providing rail stayed in one piece, like a 340-foot-long (104-meter) spear, when it was ripped from the ground, investigators said. The rail then sliced through the first passenger car, contributing to the death toll. ... NTSB investigators said the lack of a “controlled failure” mechanism that would split up third rails in such situations was a potential safety problem. The agency recommended that railways that use third rails evaluate the safety risks at ground-level crossings like the one where the crash happened, in the town of Mount Pleasant. The town was weighing whether to close the crossing altogether.
....
___
Associated Press writer Michael Balsamo contributed to this report from Los Angeles.
Originally published July 24, 2017 at 9:25 pm Updated July 25, 2017 at 5:51 pm
By COLLEEN LONG and JENNIFER PELTZ
The Associated Press
NEW YORK (AP) — Federal safety investigators said Tuesday they can’t determine why an SUV ended up in the path of an oncoming commuter train, causing a crash that killed six people at a rail crossing in suburban New York in 2015. ... Detailing the results of the nearly 2 1/2-year investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board suggested evaluating the safety risks at some rail crossings and said the design of the train’s power-providing third rail played a role in the toll of deaths and injuries in the crash in the community of Valhalla. The NTSB concluded the SUV driver’s actions were the probable cause of the wreck, but Chairman Robert Sumwalt said those actions remained a mystery.
....
Ellen Brody drove onto the tracks, and when the gate arm came down onto her SUV, she got out and inspected the vehicle before getting back in and driving further onto the tracks. The impact of the crash sparked an explosion, and flames blasted into the Metro-North train, burning out the first rail car and killing Brody and five people aboard the train. More than a dozen others were injured.
Brody wasn’t on the phone, impaired or fatigued, NTSB investigators found. They found all the signals were working properly; the train’s brakes worked and were pulled on time; the warning signs at the crossing worked and were properly marked; the train wasn’t speeding; the engineer wasn’t fatigued or distracted; the track wasn’t faulty; and the emergency exit windows worked. ... Sumwalt hypothesized that Brody wasn’t aware that she had driven into a railroad crossing while inching through traffic.
....
The power-providing rail stayed in one piece, like a 340-foot-long (104-meter) spear, when it was ripped from the ground, investigators said. The rail then sliced through the first passenger car, contributing to the death toll. ... NTSB investigators said the lack of a “controlled failure” mechanism that would split up third rails in such situations was a potential safety problem. The agency recommended that railways that use third rails evaluate the safety risks at ground-level crossings like the one where the crash happened, in the town of Mount Pleasant. The town was weighing whether to close the crossing altogether.
....
___
Associated Press writer Michael Balsamo contributed to this report from Los Angeles.
I've seen photographs of the incident. The SUV was shoved into the third rail (aka, the power-providing rail), which pierced the SUV near its fuel tank. Look at the rear door on the driver's side:
Transportation
CSX train derails in Northeast Washington, leaking hazardous chemicals and disrupting travel
By Faiz Siddiqui, Luz Lazo and Michael Smith May 1, 2016
A CSX freight train derailed in Northeast Washington early Sunday, spilling hazardous chemicals along a busy rail corridor. The wreck stranded some residents away from their homes, forced the closure of a Metro station and snarled traffic as emergency personnel sought to contain the leaks and clear the wreckage.
Officials said 14 rail cars of the 175-car train left the tracks. A rail engineer and a conductor had been aboard the train but were accounted for, authorities said. No evacuations were ordered, and no one was injured.
....
Peter Hermann, Perry Stein and Ashley Halsey III contributed to this report.
Faiz Siddiqui is a metro reporter covering transportation and local issues. He has previously contributed to NPR, The Boston Globe and the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette.
Follow @faizsays
Luz Lazo writes about transportation and development. She has recently written about the challenges of bus commuting, Metro’s dark stations, and the impact of sequestration on air travel.
Follow @luzcita
Michael Smith covers breaking news on the weekends.
CSX train derails in Northeast Washington, leaking hazardous chemicals and disrupting travel
By Faiz Siddiqui, Luz Lazo and Michael Smith May 1, 2016
A CSX freight train derailed in Northeast Washington early Sunday, spilling hazardous chemicals along a busy rail corridor. The wreck stranded some residents away from their homes, forced the closure of a Metro station and snarled traffic as emergency personnel sought to contain the leaks and clear the wreckage.
Officials said 14 rail cars of the 175-car train left the tracks. A rail engineer and a conductor had been aboard the train but were accounted for, authorities said. No evacuations were ordered, and no one was injured.
....
Peter Hermann, Perry Stein and Ashley Halsey III contributed to this report.
Faiz Siddiqui is a metro reporter covering transportation and local issues. He has previously contributed to NPR, The Boston Globe and the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette.
Follow @faizsays
Luz Lazo writes about transportation and development. She has recently written about the challenges of bus commuting, Metro’s dark stations, and the impact of sequestration on air travel.
Follow @luzcita
Michael Smith covers breaking news on the weekends.
There was this question:
Rain-Snow Line
5/1/2016 8:01 PM EDT [Edited]
How do freights get thru Washington if they are coming from Cumberland?
ETA -- GreaterGreaterWashington to the rescue.
From that article:
This isn't new, but I don't think the story got posted at DU.
1 dead, 1 missing in Union Pacific train crash in Wyoming
Shane Sanderson shane.sanderson@trib.com Oct 5, 2018
Rail cars are strewn about Friday in a sparsely populated area about 18 miles west of Cheyenne, Wyo., after a freight train crashed into the back of another freight train the night before. The crashed killed at least one crew member with another missing and derailing more than 50 train cars.
Jacob Richard Byk, The Wyoming Tribune Eagle
A Union Pacific worker died Thursday evening in a train crash west of Cheyenne. A second worker remained missing Friday.
The crash happened at 7:45 p.m. when an eastbound train hit a second, stopped train 18 miles west of Wyoming's capital city, according to the Cheyenne Mayor's Office.
Union Pacific spokeswoman Raquel Espinoza said Friday that local emergency response agencies and Union Pacific workers were still looking for the missing person. She declined to offer details about the missing person. ... "It is a very sad day for Union Pacific," she said.
The spokeswoman said the wreck occurred when a moving train hit the rear of a stopped train, both of which were eastbound. Espinoza said an investigation would determine why the train had stopped, among other things.
....
Shane Sanderson shane.sanderson@trib.com Oct 5, 2018
Rail cars are strewn about Friday in a sparsely populated area about 18 miles west of Cheyenne, Wyo., after a freight train crashed into the back of another freight train the night before. The crashed killed at least one crew member with another missing and derailing more than 50 train cars.
Jacob Richard Byk, The Wyoming Tribune Eagle
A Union Pacific worker died Thursday evening in a train crash west of Cheyenne. A second worker remained missing Friday.
The crash happened at 7:45 p.m. when an eastbound train hit a second, stopped train 18 miles west of Wyoming's capital city, according to the Cheyenne Mayor's Office.
Union Pacific spokeswoman Raquel Espinoza said Friday that local emergency response agencies and Union Pacific workers were still looking for the missing person. She declined to offer details about the missing person. ... "It is a very sad day for Union Pacific," she said.
The spokeswoman said the wreck occurred when a moving train hit the rear of a stopped train, both of which were eastbound. Espinoza said an investigation would determine why the train had stopped, among other things.
....
Train Derailment In Laramie County – UPDATE
Kevin Knapp, Outliers News POSTED ON OCTOBER 9, 2018
UPDATE 10/9: The body of a railroad employee listed as missing after last week’s derailment in Laramie County has been recovered.
The Union Pacific Railroad released a written statement to KGAB-AM, which reads as follows:
“It is with great sadness that we confirm the loss of two Union Pacific employees involved in the tragic accident that occurred in Laramie County on Thursday, October 4. Employee Jason Martinez, originally reported as missing after the accident, was fatally injured. His body was recovered Saturday. Benjamin Brozovich was also fatally injured in the accident. Words cannot express our sorrow, and our thoughts and prayers are with their families during this difficult time.”
{The rest is the original story.}
According to the Associated Press, a “catastrophic” train derailment has occurred in Laramie County.
{snip}
Kevin Knapp, Outliers News POSTED ON OCTOBER 9, 2018
UPDATE 10/9: The body of a railroad employee listed as missing after last week’s derailment in Laramie County has been recovered.
The Union Pacific Railroad released a written statement to KGAB-AM, which reads as follows:
“It is with great sadness that we confirm the loss of two Union Pacific employees involved in the tragic accident that occurred in Laramie County on Thursday, October 4. Employee Jason Martinez, originally reported as missing after the accident, was fatally injured. His body was recovered Saturday. Benjamin Brozovich was also fatally injured in the accident. Words cannot express our sorrow, and our thoughts and prayers are with their families during this difficult time.”
{The rest is the original story.}
According to the Associated Press, a “catastrophic” train derailment has occurred in Laramie County.
{snip}
Home » Transportation News » New safety system launch…
New safety system launch causes some delays for VRE
By Max Smith | @amaxsmith
April 10, 2019 4:14 am
Positive Train Control — a system that can slow or stop trains going too fast or approaching another train on the tracks ahead — expanded to all Fredericksburg Line trains last month. (Courtesy Virginia Railway Express via Twitter)
Virginia Railway Express partially blames the roll out of a new safety system for a number of recent delays. ... Positive Train Control — a system that can slow or stop trains going too fast or approaching another train on the tracks ahead — was first fully activated for a VRE train on the Federicksburg Line Feb. 14. Last month, it was expanded to all Fredericksburg Line trains. ... Last week, the first Manassas Line train activated the safety feature.
While staff was trained on the safety feature, it can still take several trips for train crews to get used to, VRE said. This has led to slower than usual operations, even with a help line. ... “We will continue to roll out PTC on the remaining Manassas line trains this week and work with our host railroads to minimize conditions in our service area that result in delays to VRE trains,” VRE said.
The delays are in addition to VRE mechanical issues that remain under investigation and other issues related to freight trains. VRE operates on tracks controlled by freight rail companies. The Manassas Line also runs on tracks owned by Norfolk Southern. ... State officials are talking with CSX, Amtrak and VRE about ways to improve schedules to provide better service for all three.
“We need to look at the schedules of Amtrak, VRE and the freight railroads to see if there are some efficiencies and time savings and things that could improve the customer service as well rather than just throwing a train out there just to sit behind another train,” said Michael McLaughlin, chief of rail transportation with the Department of Rail and Public Transportation. ... Just adding a single new Amtrak train from Norfolk to D.C. through Richmond took weeks of discussions, he told the Commonwealth Transportation Board Tuesday, because of the ripple effects on crowded tracks over the Potomac River and at Union Station.
....
Like WTOP on Facebook and follow @WTOP on Twitter to engage in conversation about this article and others.
© 2019 WTOP. All Rights Reserved. This website is not intended for users located within the European Economic Area.
New safety system launch causes some delays for VRE
By Max Smith | @amaxsmith
April 10, 2019 4:14 am
Positive Train Control — a system that can slow or stop trains going too fast or approaching another train on the tracks ahead — expanded to all Fredericksburg Line trains last month. (Courtesy Virginia Railway Express via Twitter)
Virginia Railway Express partially blames the roll out of a new safety system for a number of recent delays. ... Positive Train Control — a system that can slow or stop trains going too fast or approaching another train on the tracks ahead — was first fully activated for a VRE train on the Federicksburg Line Feb. 14. Last month, it was expanded to all Fredericksburg Line trains. ... Last week, the first Manassas Line train activated the safety feature.
While staff was trained on the safety feature, it can still take several trips for train crews to get used to, VRE said. This has led to slower than usual operations, even with a help line. ... “We will continue to roll out PTC on the remaining Manassas line trains this week and work with our host railroads to minimize conditions in our service area that result in delays to VRE trains,” VRE said.
The delays are in addition to VRE mechanical issues that remain under investigation and other issues related to freight trains. VRE operates on tracks controlled by freight rail companies. The Manassas Line also runs on tracks owned by Norfolk Southern. ... State officials are talking with CSX, Amtrak and VRE about ways to improve schedules to provide better service for all three.
“We need to look at the schedules of Amtrak, VRE and the freight railroads to see if there are some efficiencies and time savings and things that could improve the customer service as well rather than just throwing a train out there just to sit behind another train,” said Michael McLaughlin, chief of rail transportation with the Department of Rail and Public Transportation. ... Just adding a single new Amtrak train from Norfolk to D.C. through Richmond took weeks of discussions, he told the Commonwealth Transportation Board Tuesday, because of the ripple effects on crowded tracks over the Potomac River and at Union Station.
....
Like WTOP on Facebook and follow @WTOP on Twitter to engage in conversation about this article and others.
© 2019 WTOP. All Rights Reserved. This website is not intended for users located within the European Economic Area.
August 12, 2020
FRA “Highly Pleased” With 98.8% PTC Implementation
Written by Andrew Corselli, Managing Editor
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)’s second-quarter 2020 update on railroads’ self-reported progress on fully implementing Positive Train Control (PTC) by the Dec. 31, 2020 deadline shows that, as of June 30, 2020, the job is 98.8% complete. Nearly all railroads subject to the statutory mandate are operating their systems in revenue service or in advanced field testing, known as revenue service demonstration (RSD), with PTC technology remaining to be activated on only approximately 700 required route-miles.
As of June 30, PTC systems were in RSD or in operation on approximately 56,846 of the 57,537 route-miles subject to the mandate. This represents a 0.7% point increase since 1Q20 and indicates that PTC technology was activated on an additional 305 miles during 2Q. As previously reported, PTC systems are currently governing operations on all PTC-mandated main lines owned or controlled by Class I railroads and other freight host railroads. As of June 30, 76.1% of commuter railroads’ mandated route miles were governed by PTC technology—a 12.9% point increase since the last quarter.
In addition, as of June 30, host railroads reported that interoperability has been achieved by 65.5% of the 220 applicable, host-tenant railroad relationships—a 17% point increase since 1Q20.
{snip}
Infographics depicting railroads’ progress toward fully implementing PTC systems as of June 30 can be found here. The public version of each railroad’s Quarterly PTC Progress Report for 2Q20 can be found here.
{snip}
FRA “Highly Pleased” With 98.8% PTC Implementation
Written by Andrew Corselli, Managing Editor
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)’s second-quarter 2020 update on railroads’ self-reported progress on fully implementing Positive Train Control (PTC) by the Dec. 31, 2020 deadline shows that, as of June 30, 2020, the job is 98.8% complete. Nearly all railroads subject to the statutory mandate are operating their systems in revenue service or in advanced field testing, known as revenue service demonstration (RSD), with PTC technology remaining to be activated on only approximately 700 required route-miles.
As of June 30, PTC systems were in RSD or in operation on approximately 56,846 of the 57,537 route-miles subject to the mandate. This represents a 0.7% point increase since 1Q20 and indicates that PTC technology was activated on an additional 305 miles during 2Q. As previously reported, PTC systems are currently governing operations on all PTC-mandated main lines owned or controlled by Class I railroads and other freight host railroads. As of June 30, 76.1% of commuter railroads’ mandated route miles were governed by PTC technology—a 12.9% point increase since the last quarter.
In addition, as of June 30, host railroads reported that interoperability has been achieved by 65.5% of the 220 applicable, host-tenant railroad relationships—a 17% point increase since 1Q20.
{snip}
Infographics depicting railroads’ progress toward fully implementing PTC systems as of June 30 can be found here. The public version of each railroad’s Quarterly PTC Progress Report for 2Q20 can be found here.
{snip}
August 13, 2020
Amtrak Completes PTC Implementation
Written by Andrew Corselli, Managing Editor
Following installation on approximately one mile of slow-speed track in the Chicago terminal, Amtrak has now implemented Positive Train Control (PTC) on all of its owned or controlled tracks and locomotives.
Amtrak said it’s “continuing to work with partners throughout the industry to advance this system on host infrastructure. Amtrak is also working with tenant railroads (such as NJ Transit) that operate over Amtrak’s infrastructure to complete interoperability testing and says it “is on target for all tenant trains to be operating with PTC before the federal mandate.”
Amtrak PTC Implementation by the Numbers
To date, Amtrak has made progress implementing PTC across the routes and equipment it controls for the following:
• All 550 Amtrak-owned locomotives are fully equipped and PTC operable.
• All 11 installation/track segments completed.
• All 160 radio towers fully installed and equipped.
• All employees who require training to support PTC operations have completed training.
• 898 of 898 route-miles are in PTC operation.
{snip}
Amtrak Completes PTC Implementation
Written by Andrew Corselli, Managing Editor
Following installation on approximately one mile of slow-speed track in the Chicago terminal, Amtrak has now implemented Positive Train Control (PTC) on all of its owned or controlled tracks and locomotives.
Amtrak said it’s “continuing to work with partners throughout the industry to advance this system on host infrastructure. Amtrak is also working with tenant railroads (such as NJ Transit) that operate over Amtrak’s infrastructure to complete interoperability testing and says it “is on target for all tenant trains to be operating with PTC before the federal mandate.”
Amtrak PTC Implementation by the Numbers
To date, Amtrak has made progress implementing PTC across the routes and equipment it controls for the following:
• All 550 Amtrak-owned locomotives are fully equipped and PTC operable.
• All 11 installation/track segments completed.
• All 160 radio towers fully installed and equipped.
• All employees who require training to support PTC operations have completed training.
• 898 of 898 route-miles are in PTC operation.
{snip}
This is a late addition, but activity on this regulation might be kicking up again.
November 09, 2021 | Class I, Freight, Freight Cars, Mechanical, News, Regulatory, Short Lines & Regionals, Switching & Terminal
PHMSA, FRA Capping LNG By Rail?
Written by William C. Vantuono, Editor-in-Chief
DOT-113C120W9 LNG tank car. Chart Industries photo
On Nov. 8, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would suspend the transportation of liquefied natural gas by rail “until more research and testing can be done to ensure the safety of moving this commodity by rail.” The NPRM would presumably negate a Final Rule issued in 2019.
On June 19, 2019, PHMSA and FRA issued a final rule authorizing the bulk transportation of LNG by rail. Specifically, the rule permitted the bulk transportation of LNG in DOT-113C120W9 (DOT-113) specification tank cars with enhanced outer tank requirements and additional operational controls. The rule complied with Executive Order 13868, “Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth,” issued in April 2019.
Now it appears PHMSA and FRA are seeking to reverse course on a regulation issued during the Trump Administration. A summary of the NPRM, [49 CFR Part 172, Docket No. PHMSA–2021–0058 (HM–264A)] RIN 2137–AF55; Hazardous Materials: Suspension of HMR Amendments Authorizing Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail, reads as follows:
{snip}
Download the complete NPRM in the Federal Register:
2021-23132 Download
RT&S Managing Editor David C. Lester Contributed to this story.
PHMSA, FRA Capping LNG By Rail?
Written by William C. Vantuono, Editor-in-Chief
DOT-113C120W9 LNG tank car. Chart Industries photo
On Nov. 8, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would suspend the transportation of liquefied natural gas by rail “until more research and testing can be done to ensure the safety of moving this commodity by rail.” The NPRM would presumably negate a Final Rule issued in 2019.
On June 19, 2019, PHMSA and FRA issued a final rule authorizing the bulk transportation of LNG by rail. Specifically, the rule permitted the bulk transportation of LNG in DOT-113C120W9 (DOT-113) specification tank cars with enhanced outer tank requirements and additional operational controls. The rule complied with Executive Order 13868, “Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth,” issued in April 2019.
Now it appears PHMSA and FRA are seeking to reverse course on a regulation issued during the Trump Administration. A summary of the NPRM, [49 CFR Part 172, Docket No. PHMSA–2021–0058 (HM–264A)] RIN 2137–AF55; Hazardous Materials: Suspension of HMR Amendments Authorizing Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail, reads as follows:
{snip}
Download the complete NPRM in the Federal Register:
2021-23132 Download
RT&S Managing Editor David C. Lester Contributed to this story.
Last edited Thu Feb 9, 2023, 07:43 AM - Edit history (1)
Officials are asking about railroad safety after a fiery derailment in Ohio generated a huge plume of smoke and forced evacuations in a small town because of concerns about the toxic chemicals the train was carrying.
apnews.com
Fiery Ohio derailment raises railroad safety questions
OMAHA, Neb. (AP) — The fiery derailment of a train carrying toxic chemicals when it went off the tracks — sending a huge plume of smoke in the air and forcing residents of a small Ohio town to...
Fiery Ohio derailment raises railroad safety questions
OMAHA, Neb. (AP) — The fiery derailment of a train carrying toxic chemicals when it went off the tracks — sending a huge plume of smoke in the air and forcing residents of a small Ohio town to...
Link to tweet
Fiery Ohio derailment raises railroad safety questions
By JOSH FUNK
6 minutes ago
Josh covers railroads & Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway
Funkwrite
jfunk@ap.org
OMAHA, Neb. (AP) — The fiery derailment of a train carrying toxic chemicals — sending a huge plume of smoke in the air and forcing residents of a small Ohio town to evacuate — has highlighted the potentially disastrous consequences of train accidents and raised questions about railroad safety.
The railroad industry is generally regarded as the safest option for most goods and federal data show accidents involving hazardous materials are exceedingly rare. But with rails crossing through the heart of nearly every city and town nationwide, even one hazardous materials accident could be disastrous, especially in a populated area.
Rail unions believe the industry has gotten riskier in recent years after widespread job cuts left workers spread thin. ... “It raises all kinds of questions,” Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine told “Fox & Friends” this week when he was asked whether hazardous materials are too dangerous to transport by rail.
{snip}
Ian Jefferies, head of the Association of American Railroads trade group, said 99.9% of all hazardous materials shipments reach their destinations safely. ... Federal Railroad Administration data showed hazardous chemicals were released during 11 train accidents nationwide last year, out of roughly 535 million miles (861 million kilometers), with only two injuries reported. In the past decade, releases of hazardous materials peaked at 20 in both 2018 and 2020. ... “Railroads are the safest form of moving goods across land in the country without question,” Jefferies said. “But railroads are also working to drive toward zero incidents. Until we reach that goal, we haven’t got to where we want to be.”
{snip}
Associated Press reporter Kantele Franko in Columbus, Ohio, contributed to this report.
By JOSH FUNK
6 minutes ago
Josh covers railroads & Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway
Funkwrite
jfunk@ap.org
OMAHA, Neb. (AP) — The fiery derailment of a train carrying toxic chemicals — sending a huge plume of smoke in the air and forcing residents of a small Ohio town to evacuate — has highlighted the potentially disastrous consequences of train accidents and raised questions about railroad safety.
The railroad industry is generally regarded as the safest option for most goods and federal data show accidents involving hazardous materials are exceedingly rare. But with rails crossing through the heart of nearly every city and town nationwide, even one hazardous materials accident could be disastrous, especially in a populated area.
Rail unions believe the industry has gotten riskier in recent years after widespread job cuts left workers spread thin. ... “It raises all kinds of questions,” Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine told “Fox & Friends” this week when he was asked whether hazardous materials are too dangerous to transport by rail.
{snip}
Ian Jefferies, head of the Association of American Railroads trade group, said 99.9% of all hazardous materials shipments reach their destinations safely. ... Federal Railroad Administration data showed hazardous chemicals were released during 11 train accidents nationwide last year, out of roughly 535 million miles (861 million kilometers), with only two injuries reported. In the past decade, releases of hazardous materials peaked at 20 in both 2018 and 2020. ... “Railroads are the safest form of moving goods across land in the country without question,” Jefferies said. “But railroads are also working to drive toward zero incidents. Until we reach that goal, we haven’t got to where we want to be.”
{snip}
Associated Press reporter Kantele Franko in Columbus, Ohio, contributed to this report.
BizNS
Developing ‘intelligent’ wayside track detectors
December 2020
>> Jamie Williams, senior director mechanical operations and support, has led his team in collaborations with NS’ advanced analytics group to develop technology-driven rail car inspections.
NS’ USE OF AI TO INSPECT RAIL CARS ENHANCES SAFETY AND REDUCES BUSINESS COSTS
At around 6 a.m. on Saturday, Nov. 14, Mabby Amouie got out of bed and checked his overnight email. Scanning a series of messages, he learned that his team’s work very likely had helped prevent a train derailment earlier that morning on our busy Chicago Line, just west of Elkhart, Indiana. ... “It was fantastic. I was really happy,” said Amouie, Norfolk Southern’s director of advanced analytics and chief data scientist. ... Even while they’re sleeping, Amouie and his team of data scientists produce results. Call it the power of artificial intelligence.
In close collaboration with NS’ mechanical operations forces, Amouie’s analytics team has been developing deep learning algorithms that enable wayside detectors to intelligently inspect passing rail cars for defects that could derail a train. Having started with a focus on car coupler systems, the team now is making progress on algorithms to identify defects in air hoses, wheels, bearings, and trucks. ... “With our deep-learning algorithms, we are embedding human intelligence into machines,” Amouie said. “Essentially, we’re training the machine to look for certain things, and the machine learns as it applies this knowledge to the world.”
>> Mabby Amouie, director advanced analytics and chief data scientist, is leading the effort to develop intelligent wayside detectors to inspect passing rail cars.
Advancing toward technology-driven inspections
Combining cameras and artificial intelligence, these wayside machine vision detectors capture images and data, analyze them in real time, and send alerts when potential defects are identified. The email alerts are issued automatically, without human involvement, going to the mechanical wayside desk in Atlanta’s Network Operations Center – no matter the time of day or night. ... As work advances, the goal in the years ahead is to develop a series of detectors capable of performing automated train inspections at track speed, with no need to slow or stop the train.
“With the work that Mabby and his team are doing, we’re setting the stage and pushing this dynamic train inspection in the right way, both for NS and the entire industry,” said Jamie Williams, senior director mechanical operations and support, whose team provides the business intelligence that our advanced analytics group uses to develop the algorithms.
{snip}
Developing ‘intelligent’ wayside track detectors
December 2020
>> Jamie Williams, senior director mechanical operations and support, has led his team in collaborations with NS’ advanced analytics group to develop technology-driven rail car inspections.
NS’ USE OF AI TO INSPECT RAIL CARS ENHANCES SAFETY AND REDUCES BUSINESS COSTS
At around 6 a.m. on Saturday, Nov. 14, Mabby Amouie got out of bed and checked his overnight email. Scanning a series of messages, he learned that his team’s work very likely had helped prevent a train derailment earlier that morning on our busy Chicago Line, just west of Elkhart, Indiana. ... “It was fantastic. I was really happy,” said Amouie, Norfolk Southern’s director of advanced analytics and chief data scientist. ... Even while they’re sleeping, Amouie and his team of data scientists produce results. Call it the power of artificial intelligence.
In close collaboration with NS’ mechanical operations forces, Amouie’s analytics team has been developing deep learning algorithms that enable wayside detectors to intelligently inspect passing rail cars for defects that could derail a train. Having started with a focus on car coupler systems, the team now is making progress on algorithms to identify defects in air hoses, wheels, bearings, and trucks. ... “With our deep-learning algorithms, we are embedding human intelligence into machines,” Amouie said. “Essentially, we’re training the machine to look for certain things, and the machine learns as it applies this knowledge to the world.”
>> Mabby Amouie, director advanced analytics and chief data scientist, is leading the effort to develop intelligent wayside detectors to inspect passing rail cars.
Advancing toward technology-driven inspections
Combining cameras and artificial intelligence, these wayside machine vision detectors capture images and data, analyze them in real time, and send alerts when potential defects are identified. The email alerts are issued automatically, without human involvement, going to the mechanical wayside desk in Atlanta’s Network Operations Center – no matter the time of day or night. ... As work advances, the goal in the years ahead is to develop a series of detectors capable of performing automated train inspections at track speed, with no need to slow or stop the train.
“With the work that Mabby and his team are doing, we’re setting the stage and pushing this dynamic train inspection in the right way, both for NS and the entire industry,” said Jamie Williams, senior director mechanical operations and support, whose team provides the business intelligence that our advanced analytics group uses to develop the algorithms.
{snip}
Commentary
February 26, 2023 | Freight
A Veteran Railroader’s Perspective on East Palestine and the Rail Industry’s Future
Written by Richard L. Beadles
Fire fighters receive instruction on a safety train tank car. Norfolk Southern photo
As a long-retired railroad president and current rail and transportation aficionado—but certainly not an expert—I was encouraged by a friend to offer my perspective on the Norfolk Southern freight train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. ... Much criticism has been directed at Norfolk Southern. While it is understandable that the locals are very concerned, the media has had a field day quoting misinformed and agenda-advancing “experts” on rail safety, “corporate greed” and environmental degradation.
Let me say from the outset that I have never been to East Palestine, nor am I familiar with NS operations at that location, But I do know a little bit about the rail industry and its recent history, including train operations. While my days of hands-on rail operations are long gone, some principles are timeless. Here in Richmond, Va., I observe NS operations and maintenance, and I have every reason to believe that the quality of maintenance and operation on that Ohio line segment was exceptionally high.
First, I shall speculate on the origins of the suspected ill-fated railcar bearing/wheelset assembly that apparently failed on Feb. 3. The loads of vinyl chloride originated a long distance from where NS picked up the train at interchange, destined undoubtedly to a PVC or other plastics manufacturer in the Northeast for ultimate consumption and conversion into a finished product for U.S. consumers. Thus, we all have a stake in the process of transporting vinyl chloride and other related chemical products classified as hazardous materials (hazmat). Such chemical products are used in the manufacture of thousands of products eagerly purchased and consumed by the general public.
Because rail freight is usually the least-expensive, safest and most convenient mode of transportation, storage, and consumption by consignees of chemical shippers’ products, producers and users tend to utilize high-capacity rail tank cars for hazmat movement (not all are so classified). While railroads such as NS will tell you they are legally obligated to accept and move such shipments because of their common carrier status (an antiquated regulatory term more honored in theory than practice), the U.S. rail industry covets this business because it commands high freight transportation charges, and thus tends to be quite profitable.
The carloads of vinyl chloride in the accident did not move in a railroad-owned car. Almost all such cars are owned by shippers, or more commonly, by equipment leasing companies. This will be a very important issue in the case of claims for loss, damage and other accident-related costs. It was not an NS-owned freight car that caused the problem.
{snip}
The alternative is to divert vinyl chloride and hazmat to our Interstate highways. Anybody in favor of that?
Richard L. Beadles was formerly President and CEO of CSX predecessor Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad. Now 86, He has served as director, board member and fellow at the Virginia Rail Policy Institute. Beadles considers himself to be an independent rail and transportation analyst, and an advocate of rail and transit development. He believes that a major shift in national transportation infrastructure funding and development policies and priorities will be necessary in order to effectively address current and future energy, environmental, quality of life, and global economic competitiveness challenges. Originally a hands-on railroader, up from the ranks, Beadles had a wide variety of operating, marketing and executive experience from the 1950s until retirement. As a former President and CEO of the RF&P and later of CSX Realty, the former real estate and development unit of CSX Corp., he went on to lead Richmond-based real estate advisory firm MGT Realty Advisors, until a second retirement several years ago. Immersed in land use and transportation issues of Northern Virginia between 1965 and 1995, Beadles came to appreciate the linkage between urban development and transportation challenges, and to see the opportunities for better utilization of rail corridors. He was directly involved in the development of Crystal City as RF&P’s principal officer in charge of the railroad’s land redevelopment effort at the former Potomac Yard in Arlington and Alexandria, Va. Later, with CSX, he was similarly engaged in urban real estate and transportation in various cities in the eastern half of the U.S., including Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Atlanta, Chicago, and elsewhere, including James Center in downtown Richmond. As a member of for Virginia Governor Mark Warner’s 2004 Rail Study Commission, Beadles played a supporting role in the creation of the Virginia Rail Enhancement Fund and its companion facility, the State Rail Advisory Board. Subsequently, Governor Warner appointed Beadles to the Rail Advisory Board. An alumnus of the Business School at Virginia Commonwealth University, Beadles has i served on the VCU Board of Visitors, and was a charter member of the VCU Real Estate Foundation. At one time he chaired the VCU real estate program’s external support group. More also served as chairman of the Port of Richmond Commission. He delights in opportunities to combine involvement in urban planning and transportation, but his current passion is preservation of the best of rural America and the protection of Virginia’s environment. The opinions expressed here are his own.
February 26, 2023 | Freight
A Veteran Railroader’s Perspective on East Palestine and the Rail Industry’s Future
Written by Richard L. Beadles
Fire fighters receive instruction on a safety train tank car. Norfolk Southern photo
As a long-retired railroad president and current rail and transportation aficionado—but certainly not an expert—I was encouraged by a friend to offer my perspective on the Norfolk Southern freight train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. ... Much criticism has been directed at Norfolk Southern. While it is understandable that the locals are very concerned, the media has had a field day quoting misinformed and agenda-advancing “experts” on rail safety, “corporate greed” and environmental degradation.
Let me say from the outset that I have never been to East Palestine, nor am I familiar with NS operations at that location, But I do know a little bit about the rail industry and its recent history, including train operations. While my days of hands-on rail operations are long gone, some principles are timeless. Here in Richmond, Va., I observe NS operations and maintenance, and I have every reason to believe that the quality of maintenance and operation on that Ohio line segment was exceptionally high.
First, I shall speculate on the origins of the suspected ill-fated railcar bearing/wheelset assembly that apparently failed on Feb. 3. The loads of vinyl chloride originated a long distance from where NS picked up the train at interchange, destined undoubtedly to a PVC or other plastics manufacturer in the Northeast for ultimate consumption and conversion into a finished product for U.S. consumers. Thus, we all have a stake in the process of transporting vinyl chloride and other related chemical products classified as hazardous materials (hazmat). Such chemical products are used in the manufacture of thousands of products eagerly purchased and consumed by the general public.
Because rail freight is usually the least-expensive, safest and most convenient mode of transportation, storage, and consumption by consignees of chemical shippers’ products, producers and users tend to utilize high-capacity rail tank cars for hazmat movement (not all are so classified). While railroads such as NS will tell you they are legally obligated to accept and move such shipments because of their common carrier status (an antiquated regulatory term more honored in theory than practice), the U.S. rail industry covets this business because it commands high freight transportation charges, and thus tends to be quite profitable.
The carloads of vinyl chloride in the accident did not move in a railroad-owned car. Almost all such cars are owned by shippers, or more commonly, by equipment leasing companies. This will be a very important issue in the case of claims for loss, damage and other accident-related costs. It was not an NS-owned freight car that caused the problem.
{snip}
The alternative is to divert vinyl chloride and hazmat to our Interstate highways. Anybody in favor of that?
Richard L. Beadles was formerly President and CEO of CSX predecessor Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad. Now 86, He has served as director, board member and fellow at the Virginia Rail Policy Institute. Beadles considers himself to be an independent rail and transportation analyst, and an advocate of rail and transit development. He believes that a major shift in national transportation infrastructure funding and development policies and priorities will be necessary in order to effectively address current and future energy, environmental, quality of life, and global economic competitiveness challenges. Originally a hands-on railroader, up from the ranks, Beadles had a wide variety of operating, marketing and executive experience from the 1950s until retirement. As a former President and CEO of the RF&P and later of CSX Realty, the former real estate and development unit of CSX Corp., he went on to lead Richmond-based real estate advisory firm MGT Realty Advisors, until a second retirement several years ago. Immersed in land use and transportation issues of Northern Virginia between 1965 and 1995, Beadles came to appreciate the linkage between urban development and transportation challenges, and to see the opportunities for better utilization of rail corridors. He was directly involved in the development of Crystal City as RF&P’s principal officer in charge of the railroad’s land redevelopment effort at the former Potomac Yard in Arlington and Alexandria, Va. Later, with CSX, he was similarly engaged in urban real estate and transportation in various cities in the eastern half of the U.S., including Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Atlanta, Chicago, and elsewhere, including James Center in downtown Richmond. As a member of for Virginia Governor Mark Warner’s 2004 Rail Study Commission, Beadles played a supporting role in the creation of the Virginia Rail Enhancement Fund and its companion facility, the State Rail Advisory Board. Subsequently, Governor Warner appointed Beadles to the Rail Advisory Board. An alumnus of the Business School at Virginia Commonwealth University, Beadles has i served on the VCU Board of Visitors, and was a charter member of the VCU Real Estate Foundation. At one time he chaired the VCU real estate program’s external support group. More also served as chairman of the Port of Richmond Commission. He delights in opportunities to combine involvement in urban planning and transportation, but his current passion is preservation of the best of rural America and the protection of Virginia’s environment. The opinions expressed here are his own.
March 03, 2023 | Regulatory
East Palestine: NTSB Examining Tank Car Hatch Covers
Written by Carolina Worrell, Senior Editor
Following the completion of damage assessment inspections of the 11 Norfolk Southern (NS) hazardous materials (hazmat) tank cars, including the five carrying vinyl chloride, that derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, on Feb. 3, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) says it is “concerned that aluminum protective housing covers on some tank cars melted or were consumed when pressure relief devices (PRDs) vented burning gas while functioning as designed to relieve tank pressure.”
The five derailed railcars carrying vinyl chloride were DOT-105J300W tank cars. Preliminary examination, which was completed Feb. 22 and released Feb. 23, suggests that melted aluminum may have dripped into some PRDs, possibly degrading their performance (see Figure 1, below), according to NTSB. The tank car wreckage was released to NS on Feb 24.
Figure 1. Tank car OCPX80235 with missing aluminum protective housing cover and metallic debris contained within the protective housing (left), and OCPX80370 with open steel protective housing cover (right) in East Palestine, Ohio. (Source: NTSB)
According to NTSB, when a tank car is exposed to fire conditions and its contents are heated, the pressure inside the tank rises. This, NTSB says, “can lead to loss of tank shell strength and eventually a breach. To protect emergency responders and the public from the possibility of catastrophic tank failure under fire conditions, the pressure inside tank cars must be controlled. PRDs are intended to regulate internal pressure by releasing small quantities of material and reclosing after normal conditions are restored. This reduces the probability of a breach in the tank shell and limits the amount of energy a breach can release if one occurs. Properly functioning PRDs thus reduce the potential for catastrophic tank failure.” Figure 2 (below) illustrates PRD function during the East Palestine derailment.
Figure 2. Energetic pressure relief from a vinyl chloride tank car, East Palestine, Ohio, on Feb. 4. After releasing material, the PRD closed and remained closed. (Source: NTSB)
According to the preliminary investigation, NTSB discovered that three of the examined derailed vinyl chloride tank cars were manufactured in the 1990s with aluminum protective housing covers. Although the number of tank cars in flammable gas service with aluminum protective housing covers is presently unknown, NTSB has requested industry data to determine the size of the potentially affected fleet.
{snip}
East Palestine: NTSB Examining Tank Car Hatch Covers
Written by Carolina Worrell, Senior Editor
Following the completion of damage assessment inspections of the 11 Norfolk Southern (NS) hazardous materials (hazmat) tank cars, including the five carrying vinyl chloride, that derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, on Feb. 3, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) says it is “concerned that aluminum protective housing covers on some tank cars melted or were consumed when pressure relief devices (PRDs) vented burning gas while functioning as designed to relieve tank pressure.”
The five derailed railcars carrying vinyl chloride were DOT-105J300W tank cars. Preliminary examination, which was completed Feb. 22 and released Feb. 23, suggests that melted aluminum may have dripped into some PRDs, possibly degrading their performance (see Figure 1, below), according to NTSB. The tank car wreckage was released to NS on Feb 24.
Figure 1. Tank car OCPX80235 with missing aluminum protective housing cover and metallic debris contained within the protective housing (left), and OCPX80370 with open steel protective housing cover (right) in East Palestine, Ohio. (Source: NTSB)
According to NTSB, when a tank car is exposed to fire conditions and its contents are heated, the pressure inside the tank rises. This, NTSB says, “can lead to loss of tank shell strength and eventually a breach. To protect emergency responders and the public from the possibility of catastrophic tank failure under fire conditions, the pressure inside tank cars must be controlled. PRDs are intended to regulate internal pressure by releasing small quantities of material and reclosing after normal conditions are restored. This reduces the probability of a breach in the tank shell and limits the amount of energy a breach can release if one occurs. Properly functioning PRDs thus reduce the potential for catastrophic tank failure.” Figure 2 (below) illustrates PRD function during the East Palestine derailment.
Figure 2. Energetic pressure relief from a vinyl chloride tank car, East Palestine, Ohio, on Feb. 4. After releasing material, the PRD closed and remained closed. (Source: NTSB)
According to the preliminary investigation, NTSB discovered that three of the examined derailed vinyl chloride tank cars were manufactured in the 1990s with aluminum protective housing covers. Although the number of tank cars in flammable gas service with aluminum protective housing covers is presently unknown, NTSB has requested industry data to determine the size of the potentially affected fleet.
{snip}
PHMSA Safety Advisory Notice: Tank Cars Equipped with Aluminum Manway Covers
Thursday, March 2, 2023
PHMSA Safety Advisory - Tank Car Aluminum Manway Covers.pdf (197.92 KB)
This Safety Advisory alerts hazardous materials tank car owners and offerors of the potential harm to certain manway assemblies with aluminum protective housing covers when exposed to extreme heat. See Safety Advisory for more details.
DOT is committed to ensuring that information is available in appropriate alternative formats to meet the requirements of persons who have a disability. If you require an alternative version of files provided on this page, please contact PHMSA-Accessibility@dot.gov
Thursday, March 2, 2023
PHMSA Safety Advisory - Tank Car Aluminum Manway Covers.pdf (197.92 KB)
This Safety Advisory alerts hazardous materials tank car owners and offerors of the potential harm to certain manway assemblies with aluminum protective housing covers when exposed to extreme heat. See Safety Advisory for more details.
DOT is committed to ensuring that information is available in appropriate alternative formats to meet the requirements of persons who have a disability. If you require an alternative version of files provided on this page, please contact PHMSA-Accessibility@dot.gov
Commentary
April 23, 2023 | Freight
WHITE PAPER: Management of In-Train Forces – Challenges and Directions, First Addendum
Written by Grady C. Cothen Jr., Federal Railroad Administration (ret.)
BNSF derailment at Ludlow, Calif., March 21, 2021. Cause: FRA H504, buffing or slack action excessive, train makeup
The June 2022 White Paper supplemented here was devoted to “management of in-train forces.” This is an issue for trains of virtually all lengths and tonnages, but longer trains present special challenges. Both train makeup and train handling are critical. These challenges can be mitigated with use of DPUs (distributed power units), properly networked using radio telemetry. However, DPUS are still not being employed consistently some seven years into Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR). Further, as the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee on very long trains (VLTs) was advised in March of 2023, not all railroads are even using the most advanced radio communications features available for distributed power, let alone fully mastering the use of repeaters.
However, what has happened is that, even if DPUs are fully employed (e.g., mid-train and rear) there is still the temptation to build trains with segments that exceed prudent length and are not properly blocked. In grade or undulating territory, this can result in train air brakes showing off their faults—the reason the writer has described them as the “limiting factor” in responsible train marshalling and, particularly, automated train operations. Partial automated operations, using train energy management systems (TEMS), have not yet mastered air brakes, so they are normally cut out in grade territory.
Issues with TEMS and other on-board train technology continue to confound our understanding of accident outcomes. During the period the White Paper has been in revision, TEMS, and positive train control (PTC), have been integrated on some locomotives—but not all. Transitions from TEMS operation to manual operation seem to present challenges. De-skilling of locomotive engineers may be occurring in many circumstances, given reliance on TEMS and dynamic braking (to the exclusion of air brakes) and due to the limited time available for training in an industry barely able to handle the remaining traffic. Major railroads engaged in extensive interchange of full consists and use of various interline arrangements still show no outward sign of cooperating with respect to train marshalling principles.
This Addendum (downloadable below): Version 3.0 of the White Paper was completed in June 2022, using the latest published accident reports as of that time, which brought us through February 2022. ... As the research for this update was concluded, reports were available through the end of 2022; in the meantime, FRA has published some accident investigation reports of interest. Accordingly, this Addendum provides revisions and additions to Appendix B of the White Paper. This addendum has been circulated for review to a wide range of industry experts. Only a few responded, but those who did contributed significantly to this publication.
Being a single individual, the writer has continued to focus on events involving the four largest Class I railroads. You will note that two of those railroads are featured prominently in the Appendix. I have necessarily applied some judgment in the selection of events, because my focus has been management of in-train forces, a problem writ large in this era of PSR (or whatever alternate moniker may have, by now, been selected).
DOWNLOAD THE WHITE PAPER FIRST ADDENDUM:
Management-of-In-Train-Forces-Challenges-and-Directions-FIRST-ADDENDUM Download
Retired rail transportation consultant Grady C. Cothen Jr. retired in 2010 from the Federal Railroad Administration after 36 years in various positions: Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety Standards and Program Development (1994-2010); Associate Administrator for Safety (1991-1994); and Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel for rail safety, labor protection and asset sale projects (1975-1991). Prior to that, he served as a trial attorney in the Enforcement Division of the FRA Office of Chief Counsel. Cothen was also Acting Associate Administrator for Policy from 1986-1988, where he provided executive direction for economic, financial and traffic analysis and freight policy studies, including recommendations for Departmental positions in rail proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Cothen holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and a B.A. in Government and History from Oklahoma Baptist University. The opinions expressed here and in the attached paper are his own.
Tags: Federal Railroad Administration, Opinion
April 23, 2023 | Freight
WHITE PAPER: Management of In-Train Forces – Challenges and Directions, First Addendum
Written by Grady C. Cothen Jr., Federal Railroad Administration (ret.)
BNSF derailment at Ludlow, Calif., March 21, 2021. Cause: FRA H504, buffing or slack action excessive, train makeup
The June 2022 White Paper supplemented here was devoted to “management of in-train forces.” This is an issue for trains of virtually all lengths and tonnages, but longer trains present special challenges. Both train makeup and train handling are critical. These challenges can be mitigated with use of DPUs (distributed power units), properly networked using radio telemetry. However, DPUS are still not being employed consistently some seven years into Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR). Further, as the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee on very long trains (VLTs) was advised in March of 2023, not all railroads are even using the most advanced radio communications features available for distributed power, let alone fully mastering the use of repeaters.
However, what has happened is that, even if DPUs are fully employed (e.g., mid-train and rear) there is still the temptation to build trains with segments that exceed prudent length and are not properly blocked. In grade or undulating territory, this can result in train air brakes showing off their faults—the reason the writer has described them as the “limiting factor” in responsible train marshalling and, particularly, automated train operations. Partial automated operations, using train energy management systems (TEMS), have not yet mastered air brakes, so they are normally cut out in grade territory.
Issues with TEMS and other on-board train technology continue to confound our understanding of accident outcomes. During the period the White Paper has been in revision, TEMS, and positive train control (PTC), have been integrated on some locomotives—but not all. Transitions from TEMS operation to manual operation seem to present challenges. De-skilling of locomotive engineers may be occurring in many circumstances, given reliance on TEMS and dynamic braking (to the exclusion of air brakes) and due to the limited time available for training in an industry barely able to handle the remaining traffic. Major railroads engaged in extensive interchange of full consists and use of various interline arrangements still show no outward sign of cooperating with respect to train marshalling principles.
This Addendum (downloadable below): Version 3.0 of the White Paper was completed in June 2022, using the latest published accident reports as of that time, which brought us through February 2022. ... As the research for this update was concluded, reports were available through the end of 2022; in the meantime, FRA has published some accident investigation reports of interest. Accordingly, this Addendum provides revisions and additions to Appendix B of the White Paper. This addendum has been circulated for review to a wide range of industry experts. Only a few responded, but those who did contributed significantly to this publication.
Being a single individual, the writer has continued to focus on events involving the four largest Class I railroads. You will note that two of those railroads are featured prominently in the Appendix. I have necessarily applied some judgment in the selection of events, because my focus has been management of in-train forces, a problem writ large in this era of PSR (or whatever alternate moniker may have, by now, been selected).
DOWNLOAD THE WHITE PAPER FIRST ADDENDUM:
Management-of-In-Train-Forces-Challenges-and-Directions-FIRST-ADDENDUM Download
Retired rail transportation consultant Grady C. Cothen Jr. retired in 2010 from the Federal Railroad Administration after 36 years in various positions: Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety Standards and Program Development (1994-2010); Associate Administrator for Safety (1991-1994); and Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel for rail safety, labor protection and asset sale projects (1975-1991). Prior to that, he served as a trial attorney in the Enforcement Division of the FRA Office of Chief Counsel. Cothen was also Acting Associate Administrator for Policy from 1986-1988, where he provided executive direction for economic, financial and traffic analysis and freight policy studies, including recommendations for Departmental positions in rail proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Cothen holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and a B.A. in Government and History from Oklahoma Baptist University. The opinions expressed here and in the attached paper are his own.
Tags: Federal Railroad Administration, Opinion
Typically, Associated Press analyses and follow-up stories (i.e., not breaking news) of events involving railroads are written by Josh Funk. This story came from a reporter at a TV station in Columbus, Ohio. It has an AP tag, but it doesn't show up at the Associated Press website.
Here it is anyway.
Norfolk Southern staffer, working solo, missed danger signs of impending Ohio crash
by Darrel Rowland | Sat, July 29th 2023, 2:08 PM EDT
EAST PALESTINE, Ohio (AP) — The best chance for heading off the February derailment in eastern Ohio depended on a Norfolk Southern employee working hundreds of miles away noticing a rapidly heating wheel bearing.
But he wasn’t even looking at the readings from defect detectors along the tracks on the bearing, suspected by the National Transportation Safety Board of causing the fiery crash in East Palestine.
Why? ... Gary Rambo, automatic train control analyst for the Atlanta-based railroad, told NTSB investigators he was monitoring other Norfolk Southern trains at the same time. Thus he didn’t notice a “trending alert” from the wayside defect detector showing a spike of 103 degrees in the bearing of doomed train 32N in Ohio. ... “Honestly, I didn't see it when it first came in,” he said. “There were three other trains I was working on.”
Norfolk Southern wayside defect detector locations, (NTSB)
Such alerts are not transmitted directly to the train crew. ... Norfolk Southern defended the setup. ... “The Wayside Help Desk functioned as it was supposed to with respect to Train 32N,” the company said in a statement to ABC 6. “Norfolk Southern has been clear that we will be the gold standard for safety in our industry.”
{snip}
drowland@sbgtv.com
@darreldrowland
by Darrel Rowland | Sat, July 29th 2023, 2:08 PM EDT
EAST PALESTINE, Ohio (AP) — The best chance for heading off the February derailment in eastern Ohio depended on a Norfolk Southern employee working hundreds of miles away noticing a rapidly heating wheel bearing.
But he wasn’t even looking at the readings from defect detectors along the tracks on the bearing, suspected by the National Transportation Safety Board of causing the fiery crash in East Palestine.
Why? ... Gary Rambo, automatic train control analyst for the Atlanta-based railroad, told NTSB investigators he was monitoring other Norfolk Southern trains at the same time. Thus he didn’t notice a “trending alert” from the wayside defect detector showing a spike of 103 degrees in the bearing of doomed train 32N in Ohio. ... “Honestly, I didn't see it when it first came in,” he said. “There were three other trains I was working on.”
Norfolk Southern wayside defect detector locations, (NTSB)
Such alerts are not transmitted directly to the train crew. ... Norfolk Southern defended the setup. ... “The Wayside Help Desk functioned as it was supposed to with respect to Train 32N,” the company said in a statement to ABC 6. “Norfolk Southern has been clear that we will be the gold standard for safety in our industry.”
{snip}
drowland@sbgtv.com
@darreldrowland
6 months after the East Palestine train derailment, Congress is deadlocked on new rules for safety
FILE - Cleanup of portions of a Norfolk Southern freight train that derailed Friday night in East Palestine, Ohio, continues on Feb. 9, 2023. (AP Photo/Gene J. Puskar, File)
By STEPHEN GROVES and JOSH FUNK
Updated 6:50 AM EDT, August 3, 2023
WASHINGTON (AP) — Congress responded to the fiery train derailment in eastern Ohio earlier this year with bipartisan alarm, holding a flurry of hearings about the potential for railroad crashes to trigger even larger disasters. Both parties agreed that a legislative response was needed. Yet six months after life was upended in East Palestine, little has changed.
While President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump have praised a railroad safety bill from Ohio Sens. Sherrod Brown, a Democrat, and JD Vance, a Republican, the Senate proposal has also encountered resistance. Top GOP leaders in Congress have been hesitant to support it, and the bill has faced some opposition from the railroad industry, which holds significant sway in Washington.
As a result, it remains an open question whether the derailment that shattered life in East Palestine will become a catalyst for action. And for Republicans, the fight poses a larger test of political identity, caught between their traditional support for industry and their desire to champion voters in rural America.
“These rail lines pass frequently through Republican areas, small towns with a lot of Republican voters,” Vance told The Associated Press. “How can we look them in the eye and say, we’re doing a good job by you? If we choose the railroads over their own interests, we can’t.”
(snip)
FILE - Cleanup of portions of a Norfolk Southern freight train that derailed Friday night in East Palestine, Ohio, continues on Feb. 9, 2023. (AP Photo/Gene J. Puskar, File)
By STEPHEN GROVES and JOSH FUNK
Updated 6:50 AM EDT, August 3, 2023
WASHINGTON (AP) — Congress responded to the fiery train derailment in eastern Ohio earlier this year with bipartisan alarm, holding a flurry of hearings about the potential for railroad crashes to trigger even larger disasters. Both parties agreed that a legislative response was needed. Yet six months after life was upended in East Palestine, little has changed.
While President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump have praised a railroad safety bill from Ohio Sens. Sherrod Brown, a Democrat, and JD Vance, a Republican, the Senate proposal has also encountered resistance. Top GOP leaders in Congress have been hesitant to support it, and the bill has faced some opposition from the railroad industry, which holds significant sway in Washington.
As a result, it remains an open question whether the derailment that shattered life in East Palestine will become a catalyst for action. And for Republicans, the fight poses a larger test of political identity, caught between their traditional support for industry and their desire to champion voters in rural America.
“These rail lines pass frequently through Republican areas, small towns with a lot of Republican voters,” Vance told The Associated Press. “How can we look them in the eye and say, we’re doing a good job by you? If we choose the railroads over their own interests, we can’t.”
(snip)
The picture is deceptive. It does not show railroad employees, but people cutting across a train stopped at a grade crossing. I don't know why they chose it to accompany the article.
Regulation
What’s Missing From Railroad Safety Data? Dead Workers and Severed Limbs.
by Topher Sanders, Dan Schwartz, Danelle Morton and Gabriel Sandoval
March 13, 5 a.m. EDT
Thanks to government loopholes, rail companies haven’t been scrutinized by the Federal Railroad Administration for scores of alleged worker injuries and at least two deaths.
Train Country: Investigating Railroad Safety in America
As powerful railroad companies race to maximize profits through efficiency, safety is left behind.
ProPublica is a nonprofit newsroom that investigates abuses of power. Sign up to receive our biggest stories as soon as they’re published.
On a hot July afternoon in 2018, Gregory West found himself trudging through the mountains of northern Tennessee on what would be the last walk of his life.
The engineer and his conductor had been stuck behind a stalled train that had not budged by the end of their shift, and rail company officials told them to walk out to a road where a vehicle could meet them. It would be an hour’s journey up and down steep hills in 88-degree heat. And West, 57, had to lug two large bags of his belongings the entire way. Just as he reached the rendezvous point, he collapsed. The Campbell County medical examiner said West had pneumonia and hypertension, which decreased his oxygen supply before he died. His sister sued the railroad company, CSX, which settled with her for an undisclosed amount.
But none of that is reflected in CSX’s worker injury statistics. ProPublica only found out about it while reviewing lawsuits levied against the nation’s largest freight carriers in the past 15 years. West’s was one of at least 130 worker deaths and other injuries that were alleged to have happened on the job but that railroad companies never reported to regulators.
Among the others, according to the lawsuits, were a CSX conductor who suffered a fatal heart attack after doing physical labor on a subfreezing overnight shift and a contractor who lost three fingers rigging equipment in a Norfolk Southern rail yard.
{snip}
What’s Missing From Railroad Safety Data? Dead Workers and Severed Limbs.
by Topher Sanders, Dan Schwartz, Danelle Morton and Gabriel Sandoval
March 13, 5 a.m. EDT
Thanks to government loopholes, rail companies haven’t been scrutinized by the Federal Railroad Administration for scores of alleged worker injuries and at least two deaths.
Train Country: Investigating Railroad Safety in America
As powerful railroad companies race to maximize profits through efficiency, safety is left behind.
ProPublica is a nonprofit newsroom that investigates abuses of power. Sign up to receive our biggest stories as soon as they’re published.
On a hot July afternoon in 2018, Gregory West found himself trudging through the mountains of northern Tennessee on what would be the last walk of his life.
The engineer and his conductor had been stuck behind a stalled train that had not budged by the end of their shift, and rail company officials told them to walk out to a road where a vehicle could meet them. It would be an hour’s journey up and down steep hills in 88-degree heat. And West, 57, had to lug two large bags of his belongings the entire way. Just as he reached the rendezvous point, he collapsed. The Campbell County medical examiner said West had pneumonia and hypertension, which decreased his oxygen supply before he died. His sister sued the railroad company, CSX, which settled with her for an undisclosed amount.
But none of that is reflected in CSX’s worker injury statistics. ProPublica only found out about it while reviewing lawsuits levied against the nation’s largest freight carriers in the past 15 years. West’s was one of at least 130 worker deaths and other injuries that were alleged to have happened on the job but that railroad companies never reported to regulators.
Among the others, according to the lawsuits, were a CSX conductor who suffered a fatal heart attack after doing physical labor on a subfreezing overnight shift and a contractor who lost three fingers rigging equipment in a Norfolk Southern rail yard.
{snip}
The "automated braking system" is what the NTSB calls positive train control.
U.S. NEWS
Pennsylvania train crash highlights shortcomings of automated railroad braking system
FILE - This photo provided by Nancy Run Fire Company shows a train derailment along a riverbank in Saucon Township, Pa., March 2, 2024. The collision highlights the shortcomings of the automated braking system that was created to prevent such crashes. None of the circumstances the National Transportation Safety Board described Tuesday, March 26, in its preliminary report on the derailment would have triggered the automated positive train control system to stop the trains. (Nancy Run Fire Company via AP, File)
BY JOSH FUNK
Updated 7:02 PM EDT, March 26, 2024
The collision of three Norfolk Southern trains in Pennsylvania early this month highlights the shortcomings of the automated braking system that was created to prevent such crashes. ... None of the circumstances the National Transportation Safety Board described Tuesday in its preliminary report on the March 2 derailment would have triggered the automated positive train control system to stop the trains.
Not only was the system incapable of stopping the second train before it smashed into the back of a stopped train, but it also couldn’t stop the third train. It ran into the derailed cars blockings its track when it arrived less than a minute later. ... “PTC today has not generally been designed to protect them in that situation,” railroad safety expert Chris Barkan said.
Congress required railroads to develop the positive train control system after a deadly 2008 collision between a Metrolink commuter train and a Union Pacific freight train in Chatsworth, California. That crash killed 25 people, including the Metrolink engineer, and injured more than 100. It took more than a decade and roughly $15 billion for the railroads to design and complete the system, but it only works in certain circumstances.
In this Pennsylvania crash, the eastbound train that smashed into a stopped train in Lower Saucon Township along the Lehigh River had slowed to 13 mph (21 kph) after passing a restricted speed signal. But without a stop signal, the braking system would not have been triggered. ... The three railcars that derailed after that first collision blocked the adjacent track, and the third train smashed into them at about 22 mph (35 kph). The braking system relies on information from the railroad’s signals to stop a train, and it can’t detect when something is blocking the tracks. But given that the third train arrived less than a minute later, there wouldn’t have been enough time to stop it anyway.
{snip}
Pennsylvania train crash highlights shortcomings of automated railroad braking system
FILE - This photo provided by Nancy Run Fire Company shows a train derailment along a riverbank in Saucon Township, Pa., March 2, 2024. The collision highlights the shortcomings of the automated braking system that was created to prevent such crashes. None of the circumstances the National Transportation Safety Board described Tuesday, March 26, in its preliminary report on the derailment would have triggered the automated positive train control system to stop the trains. (Nancy Run Fire Company via AP, File)
BY JOSH FUNK
Updated 7:02 PM EDT, March 26, 2024
The collision of three Norfolk Southern trains in Pennsylvania early this month highlights the shortcomings of the automated braking system that was created to prevent such crashes. ... None of the circumstances the National Transportation Safety Board described Tuesday in its preliminary report on the March 2 derailment would have triggered the automated positive train control system to stop the trains.
Not only was the system incapable of stopping the second train before it smashed into the back of a stopped train, but it also couldn’t stop the third train. It ran into the derailed cars blockings its track when it arrived less than a minute later. ... “PTC today has not generally been designed to protect them in that situation,” railroad safety expert Chris Barkan said.
Congress required railroads to develop the positive train control system after a deadly 2008 collision between a Metrolink commuter train and a Union Pacific freight train in Chatsworth, California. That crash killed 25 people, including the Metrolink engineer, and injured more than 100. It took more than a decade and roughly $15 billion for the railroads to design and complete the system, but it only works in certain circumstances.
In this Pennsylvania crash, the eastbound train that smashed into a stopped train in Lower Saucon Township along the Lehigh River had slowed to 13 mph (21 kph) after passing a restricted speed signal. But without a stop signal, the braking system would not have been triggered. ... The three railcars that derailed after that first collision blocked the adjacent track, and the third train smashed into them at about 22 mph (35 kph). The braking system relies on information from the railroad’s signals to stop a train, and it can’t detect when something is blocking the tracks. But given that the third train arrived less than a minute later, there wouldn’t have been enough time to stop it anyway.
{snip}
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/RRD24FR009.aspx
Site of the collisions. (Courtesy of Lehigh County Emergency Management.)
Norfolk Southern Train Collisions and Derailment
What Happened
This information is preliminary and subject to change. Release Date: 26 March 2024.
On March 2, 2024, about 7:11 a.m. local time, eastbound Norfolk Southern Railway (NS) intermodal train 268H429 collided with stopped NS intermodal train 24XH101 on the same track and derailed railcars that were subsequently struck by westbound NS mixed freight train 19GH501 on the Allentown Road Subdivision near Easton, Pennsylvania.[1] As a result of the first collision, train 268H429 derailed three railcars that fouled the adjacent main track 1. Less than a minute later, a second collision occurred when train 19GH501 struck the derailed equipment while traveling westbound on main track 1.[2] As a result of the second collision, train 19GH501 derailed six railcars and two locomotives. Three of these derailed railcars were placarded as hazardous materials tank cars: one containing ethanol residue and two containing butane residue.[3] The tank cars did not breach or release hazardous materials. The two derailed locomotives partially submerged in the Lehigh River and discharged locomotive diesel fuel into the water. Seven crewmembers were transported to a local hospital, treated for minor injuries, and released. NS estimated damages to equipment and track to be about $2.5 million. At the time of the collisions, visibility conditions were daylight and overcast; the weather was 35°F with light rain.
Train 24XH101 was traveling from Atlanta, Georgia, to Croxton, New Jersey, and consisted of 3 lead locomotives and 27 intermodal railcars. Its crew consisted of an engineer and a conductor.
Train 268H429 was traveling from Landers, Illinois, to Elizabeth, New Jersey, and consisted of 2 lead locomotives and 39 intermodal railcars. Its crew consisted of an engineer and a conductor.
Train 19GH501 was traveling from Croxton, New Jersey, to Enola, Pennsylvania, and consisted of 2 lead locomotives, 1 distributed power unit, and 199 mixed freight railcars. Its crew consisted of an engineer, a conductor, and a conductor trainee.
The track near the collision site has two main tracks. Train movements in the area are authorized by wayside signal indications with an overlaid positive train control system and are coordinated by the NS dispatcher center in Atlanta, Georgia.[4]The maximum authorized speed in the area was 40 mph.[5]
Shortly before the collisions, train 24XH101 had stopped on main track 2 because of train traffic. Train 268H429, approaching from the west, proceeded through a signal that required it to operate at restricted speed.[6] Train 268H429 was traveling about 13 mph at the time of the first collision. Westbound train 19GH501 was not required to operate at restricted speed and was traveling about 22 mph at the time of the second collision, below the maximum authorized speed.
While on scene, National Transportation Safety Board investigators completed interviews; inspected locomotives and railcars; tested and downloaded data from positive train control and signal systems; and sent data from radio logs, locomotive event recorders, and outward- and inward-facing image recorders to the National Transportation Safety Board Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for analysis.
The National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation is ongoing. Future investigative activity will focus on NS rules, procedures, and crew training related to train handling.
Parties to the investigation include:
• the Federal Railroad Administration;
• NS;
• the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen;
• the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen; and
• the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers.
[1] (a) All times in this report are local times. (b) An intermodal train carries shipping containers used in intermodal freight transportation. (c) A mixed freight train includes several types of railcars and commodities.
[2] Fouling a track means the placement of an individual or equipment in such proximity to a track that the individual or equipment could be struck by a moving train or on-track equipment.
[3] The three hazardous materials tank cars were offered for shipment as having last contained UN1170, Ethanol Solutions, a Class 3 flammable liquid in packing group II, and UN1075, Liquefied Petroleum Gas, a Division 2.1 flammable gas, as specified in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 172.
[4] A positive train control system enforces speed limits and prevents a train from passing through a signal that requires it to stop.
[5] Maximum authorized speed was set by NS Keystone Division Allentown Road Subdivision Timetable Number 1, effective November 1, 2023, with revisions effective November 27, 2023.
[6] Restricted speed is defined by Federal Railroad Administration regulations in 49 Code of Federal Regulations 236.812. Restricted speed operations occur when a train operates below 20 mph (or at a lower limit set by operating rules) and at a speed that will allow it to stop within one-half the range of vision of the operator.
A 100-Ton Locomotive With No One in the Cab
Railroad unions are raising safety concerns about the growing use of remote-controlled trains after a rash of fatal accidents.
A worker replaced a ceramic cross for a man fatally struck by a train in Houston last year. Nathan Howard for The New York Times
By Frances Robles, Sergio Olmos, Mark Walker and Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs
Reporters traveled to Buffalo, Houston, Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Toledo, Ohio, to document the expanded use of remote trains.
May 27, 2024, 5:00 a.m. ET
One evening last June, as Esther Iradukunda set the table for dinner at her home in Buffalo, she heard a high-pitched cry through the kitchen window. She rushed outside and followed the screams to the train tracks that ran about 100 feet away from her house.
She found her young brother Aron lying on the tracks, run over when he chased a ball between the cars of a train that had suddenly begun to move. Now it was stopped again, but one of the boy’s legs was lodged underneath, the bone jutting through the skin, and he had grave wounds to his abdomen.
Ms. Iradukunda desperately pulled her brother clear just as the train began moving again, rolling slowly toward the CSX train yards about a quarter-mile away. Aron, now 10, survived but lost his right leg.
No one from the railroad had heard the boy’s screams or noticed him trapped on the tracks. The train had no conductor or engineer onboard; instead, its movement was being controlled by a remote operator who was not aboard the train and, under railroad protocols, could have been more than a half-mile away.
{snip}
Railroad unions are raising safety concerns about the growing use of remote-controlled trains after a rash of fatal accidents.
A worker replaced a ceramic cross for a man fatally struck by a train in Houston last year. Nathan Howard for The New York Times
By Frances Robles, Sergio Olmos, Mark Walker and Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs
Reporters traveled to Buffalo, Houston, Council Bluffs, Iowa, and Toledo, Ohio, to document the expanded use of remote trains.
May 27, 2024, 5:00 a.m. ET
One evening last June, as Esther Iradukunda set the table for dinner at her home in Buffalo, she heard a high-pitched cry through the kitchen window. She rushed outside and followed the screams to the train tracks that ran about 100 feet away from her house.
She found her young brother Aron lying on the tracks, run over when he chased a ball between the cars of a train that had suddenly begun to move. Now it was stopped again, but one of the boy’s legs was lodged underneath, the bone jutting through the skin, and he had grave wounds to his abdomen.
Ms. Iradukunda desperately pulled her brother clear just as the train began moving again, rolling slowly toward the CSX train yards about a quarter-mile away. Aron, now 10, survived but lost his right leg.
No one from the railroad had heard the boy’s screams or noticed him trapped on the tracks. The train had no conductor or engineer onboard; instead, its movement was being controlled by a remote operator who was not aboard the train and, under railroad protocols, could have been more than a half-mile away.
{snip}
Hat tip, someone on an IO.groups listserv that I'm on.
FRA report on East Palestine derailment differs slightly from NTSB analysis
By Bill Stephens | July 22, 2024
The rail safety agency asked Congress for the authority to regulate wayside detectors
The early stages of the fire following Norfolk Southern derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, on Feb. 3, 2023. NTSB; courtesy Eric’s Train Yard
WASHINGTON — The Federal Railroad Administration’s report on the Norfolk Southern hazardous materials derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, reached the same conclusions as the National Transportation Safety Board’s broader and more exhaustive probe. ... But the FRA report, released on Friday afternoon, did contain some key differences.
First, the FRA did not comment on the post-derailment decision to vent and burn five tank cars that were carrying vinyl chloride. The NTSB concluded the vent and burn was not necessary, and the board was critical of the decision-making process and communication chain that involved Norfolk Southern and its contractors. NS disputes this and has stood by the decision, which it said was made to prevent a catastrophic explosion. ... FRA sought to distance itself from the vent-and-burn decision. “FRA neither made, directed, nor participated in the decision to conduct a vent and burn operation, and the agency has no role or authority in such a decision,” the FRA said.
But the NTSB, in its recommendations, urged the FRA to update its vent-and-burn guidance: “Update and re-publish your 2007 vent and burn reports to include clear instructions to consult the shipper when considering a vent and burn, more comprehensive guidance on what products are candidates for a vent and burn along with what chemical and other hazards may result, and an updated process flow chart incorporating lessons from the East Palestine vent and burn; the re-published reports should identify the questions an incident commander should ask when considering a vent and burn, distinguish the meaning of the answers, and identify the resources necessary to make an informed decision.”
Second, the NTSB said no injuries were reported related to the Feb. 3, 2023, wreck that was caused by a wheel bearing failure. FRA, however, says that NS subsequently reported that 24 people — 18 civilians and six contractors — received minor injuries. FRA said the injuries were “due to inhalation hazards as a result of the fire that resulted from the derailment and subsequent hazardous materials remediation activities.” ... Third, NTSB and FRA reached slightly different conclusions regarding mechanical inspections of NS train 32N.
{snip}
By Bill Stephens | July 22, 2024
The rail safety agency asked Congress for the authority to regulate wayside detectors
The early stages of the fire following Norfolk Southern derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, on Feb. 3, 2023. NTSB; courtesy Eric’s Train Yard
WASHINGTON — The Federal Railroad Administration’s report on the Norfolk Southern hazardous materials derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, reached the same conclusions as the National Transportation Safety Board’s broader and more exhaustive probe. ... But the FRA report, released on Friday afternoon, did contain some key differences.
First, the FRA did not comment on the post-derailment decision to vent and burn five tank cars that were carrying vinyl chloride. The NTSB concluded the vent and burn was not necessary, and the board was critical of the decision-making process and communication chain that involved Norfolk Southern and its contractors. NS disputes this and has stood by the decision, which it said was made to prevent a catastrophic explosion. ... FRA sought to distance itself from the vent-and-burn decision. “FRA neither made, directed, nor participated in the decision to conduct a vent and burn operation, and the agency has no role or authority in such a decision,” the FRA said.
But the NTSB, in its recommendations, urged the FRA to update its vent-and-burn guidance: “Update and re-publish your 2007 vent and burn reports to include clear instructions to consult the shipper when considering a vent and burn, more comprehensive guidance on what products are candidates for a vent and burn along with what chemical and other hazards may result, and an updated process flow chart incorporating lessons from the East Palestine vent and burn; the re-published reports should identify the questions an incident commander should ask when considering a vent and burn, distinguish the meaning of the answers, and identify the resources necessary to make an informed decision.”
Second, the NTSB said no injuries were reported related to the Feb. 3, 2023, wreck that was caused by a wheel bearing failure. FRA, however, says that NS subsequently reported that 24 people — 18 civilians and six contractors — received minor injuries. FRA said the injuries were “due to inhalation hazards as a result of the fire that resulted from the derailment and subsequent hazardous materials remediation activities.” ... Third, NTSB and FRA reached slightly different conclusions regarding mechanical inspections of NS train 32N.
{snip}