03 Mar: Ouch! A Sudden Russian Flank Attack Goes Terribly Wrong - Reporting from Ukraine

Day 739: Mar 03

Today, there are a lot of interesting updates from the Kupiansk direction.
Here, after Russian forces made major adjustments to their plans in the face of disastrous operations in the Synkivka area, Russian forces launched a massive attack from a completely opposite side.
Despite their initial success in breaching the first line of defense, Russian forces failed to achieve their objective, as the purpose of the operation was to undercut and establish control over Kyslivka.
Following these developments, both Ukrainian and Russian sources report that positional fighting has resumed in the vicinity of Synkivka once again. According to various reports, Ukrainians hold at least two major defensive belts here: one around Synkivka, which has held the line for months, and another one slightly to the southeast, around Petropavlivka.
Many analysts raised the question of how can Russian forces persist with the same tactics on this attack vector after almost a year, in which advances can be estimated at a few hundred meters.
First of all, there are a few other reasonable options for advancement in other directions. If we look at the topographic map, we can see that the area currently controlled by Russian forces is blocked to the west by a double natural barrier in the form of the Oskil River and the remarkably high grounds just next to it. This double natural barrier basically goes up to the very border with Russia.
Finding a direct route from the edge of the forest to Kupyansk is another option, however, it has its drawbacks. The biggest shortcoming of this option is that this line is again too close to the local heights, from which Russian attacks could be neutralized with relative ease. On the other hand, attacking from the east would mean crossing many open field areas, which are also densely mined, making it extremely dangerous to advance. In addition, an advance from here would eventually mean suffering counterattacks from the two defensive belts.
So, considering just these geographical factors, Russians' best option seems to be to move out from the forest and take Synkivka.
Secondly, although Russian forces already control a good part of the forest, they need to control a strong point outside the forest from which they can organize larger attacks. Moreover, a mechanized advance through the forest will always be much more complicated as long as Synkivka remains under Ukrainian control since they are closely guarded from there. If Russians finally get control of this strong point, they plan to advance from there to the city through the corridor between the forest and the second defensive belt. Therefore, Russians understand its tactical importance and a necessary next step from the forest to the city.
Thirdly, as we have previously seen in this war, there’s an evident lack of adaptation on the part of the Russian army, which seems to be the case again. So far, their strategy in the area consists only of frontal attacks from the forest towards Synkivka, with very few variations from that tactic.
Just last month, combat footage of unsuccessful frontal assaults on Synkinvka took by storm the media space. The Russian columns were completely demolished, as close air reconnaissance surveillance allowed Ukrainians to ambush the attackers, unleashing artillery, anti-tank weapons, and FPV drones. In their retreat, they also ran into dense minefields. Even prominent Russian military analysts harshly criticized the lack of adaptability and plans for reassessment in the face of an evident repetition of failure.
In addition to this type of frontal attacks, different Ukrainian sources have reported the employment of "Wagner" tactics and Storm-Z battalions by Russian forces in the area. In this type of tactic, convict assault groups are launched forward, thus covering the creation of an echelon defense just behind them. This way, they have a place to retreat to and carry ammunition.
Both repetitive frontal attacks and “Wagner” tactics may imply that the Russian commanders simply agreed to accumulate marginal gains for months, even at the cost of wasting vast amounts of equipment and personnel.
Therefore, geographical reasons, the tactical importance of Synkivka as a necessary step to reach Kupiansk, and the lack of adaptability of the Russian commanders have meant that for months, we have witnessed a repetition of continuous Russian failures...