Foreign-Imposed Regime Changes Rarely Work. Why Do Countries Keep Trying? - William Spaniel

The United States is attempting something known as "foreign-imposed regime change." Historically, there are few cases where the strategy went well. Yet countries keep trying it. Why? Today's video looks at a fundamental inference problem. The ability to impose regime change generates bargaining leverage. Leaders under duress try to offer concessions commensurate with their rivals' ability to execute the strategy so as to avoid the bad outcome. As a result, capacity is uncorrelated with actually trying it. Combine that with how most countries are bad at imposing regime change, and you get an abundance of observed cases where it goes poorly and few where it goes well.

0:00 A Brief History of Foreign Imposed Regime Change
2:52 Summary of the Paradox's Cause
3:50 Why Bargaining Usually Wins
6:38 Bargaining and Observable Outcomes
9:20 How Bargaining Problems Cause Regime Change