Missile base activity in North Korea

Last edited Fri Mar 8, 2019, 10:20 AM - Edit history (1)

(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 3.7) North Korea- US: threat and pressure relationship.

The Tongchang Ri missile launch site, also referred to as the Sohae Satellite launch site, is the one where the recent construction has been reported, basically restoration of the facility to its prior condition. That is the northern most site in this Channel A News graphic.

Increased activity, noted as movement of materials by trucks, considered missile related by South Korean intelligence at a second site was reported in this Channel A News Top Ten program. That site is the Sanumdong missile general research complex 112 km to the southeast of Tongchang Ri. This site is considered significant because it is a place where ICBMs, like the Hwasong 15, are assembled and produced.

The recent activities at both sites are regarded as provocative and unwise by South Korean analysts but also as presenting an indirect, implicit threat of futher development of ICBM capability after the disappointing outcome of the Hanoi summit.

Here's a Time article on the subject:

http://time.com/5546740/north-korea-icbm-uranium-sanumdong-vehicle-activity/


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 3.7)

North Korean media, Chosun Sinbo, indicated that North Korea wishes to reengage in negotiations and expresses that by exhorting the US to taking the first steps with simultaneous action in a trust building process that can lead to denuclearization. Title of the commentary was "Corresponding measures to the dismantling of the Yongbyun nuclear facility are the basis of trust." And the statement as reported in the Channel A News broadcast was "Trump, if you do not want to miss the opportunity for denuclearization and avoid damage to your standing, before North Korea seeks a new path, decide to engage in simultaneous action, as a first step, in the process that must go forward to prepare to make it a reality."

It's not clear if the relative dangers of this approach have been accurately weighed by the North Koreans. Some conservative analysts regard it as a bluff for lack of a more nuanced characterization. The danger is that what is clearly implied that a loss of face is involved not for the US, but rather that Kim had already experienced a loss of face in Hanoi by the way the talks were carried out, and that most Korean analysts regard him as having been humiliated as much as he had tried to conceal that.

In the proposed course of action is the referenence to "another path" that Kim had mentioned in his new year's address. As noted around the time of the new year's speech there is a hint of reluctance by Kim to find this other path, but here it is again. The Channel A News analysts suggest this is linked to Trump's statement that Kim Jong Un had promised not to engage in missile flights or nuclear tests despite the lack of a written agreement or communique from the Hanoi summit, while indications on the ground suggest potentially that he might. The Chosun Sinbo statement suggests that they are reluctant to go ahead with such an threat. Channel A News Top Ten analysts referred to the situation as a pscyhological war.