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U.S.-ROK Relations An Ironclad Alliance or a Transactional House of Cards?
Brief for Congressional OutreachU.S.-ROK Relations
An Ironclad Alliance or a Transactional House of Cards?
by David Maxwell
November 15, 2019
...According to reports, in addition to demanding $5 billion in funding for U.S. forces, the United States has increased the categories of support from three to six.[10] There has been no publicly released information on how these new demands were determined. Although not confirmed, the new categories appear to be operational support, training and readiness, and troop salaries, which have never been funded by host nations.
Operational support is assumed to mean funding for the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to South Korea. An example is the deployment of B-52 or B-1 bombers to support deterrence messaging, but this category may also include port calls for U.S. naval ships operating in the Korean theater. How operational support is defined is critical. Recent press reports of the deployment of the RC-135 Cobra Ball to Japan for surveillance of North Korean targets raise the question of whether the United States might ask the ROK government to fund such deployments.
Furthermore, if the ROK government balks at funding operational support or says no to funding specific operations, this will affect U.S. military operations and capabilities that may be critical for deterrence or early warning of North Korean plans. Conversely, if the ROK determines a need for U.S. assets, will South Korea still be able to request them as long as it pays for the deployment? A new alliance paradigm will be established, and new processes and procedures will have to be developed...
Operational support is assumed to mean funding for the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to South Korea. An example is the deployment of B-52 or B-1 bombers to support deterrence messaging, but this category may also include port calls for U.S. naval ships operating in the Korean theater. How operational support is defined is critical. Recent press reports of the deployment of the RC-135 Cobra Ball to Japan for surveillance of North Korean targets raise the question of whether the United States might ask the ROK government to fund such deployments.
Furthermore, if the ROK government balks at funding operational support or says no to funding specific operations, this will affect U.S. military operations and capabilities that may be critical for deterrence or early warning of North Korean plans. Conversely, if the ROK determines a need for U.S. assets, will South Korea still be able to request them as long as it pays for the deployment? A new alliance paradigm will be established, and new processes and procedures will have to be developed...
https://www.nbr.org/publication/u-s-rok-relations-an-ironclad-alliance-or-a-transactional-house-of-cards/
This is a great briefing by the retired Army Colonel David Maxwell on the current SMA negotiating fiasco going on right now between the US and South Korea. The excerpt above only gives a small indication of the radical changes implicated by the Trump administration's unreasonable and unprecedented 5 billion dollar demand on South Korea, a state which spends more on national defense per capita than other US allies. The US SMA negotiating team's overreach is explicitly intended to have consequences for all US alliances as Trump made clear recently in a visit to Europe. The House Armed Services Committee should be having hearings right now to consider the harmful course the Trump administration is taking in South Korea and its implications for our alliances world wide as soon as possible.
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U.S.-ROK Relations An Ironclad Alliance or a Transactional House of Cards? (Original Post)
soryang
Dec 2019
OP
bottom line, China is becoming THE player across SE Asia and the Pacific rim
beachbumbob
Dec 2019
#1
beachbumbob
(9,263 posts)1. bottom line, China is becoming THE player across SE Asia and the Pacific rim
the nutcases in trump admin simply don't care as they hate having to have any foriegn diplomacy as they are trapped in the mindset of the late 1940's and 50s
soryang
(3,304 posts)2. This is the USFK plan to furlough South Korean national employees
(Yonhap Feature) Fears of furloughs haunt Korean workers in USFK amid lackluster defense cost talks
Feature 11:42 December 02, 2019
By Song Sang-ho
...Their anxiety mounted further when the USFK headquarters sent to their Korean Employees Union in October a memo hinting at the possibility of a furlough for workers.
"This memo officially informs you of the potential to furlough appropriated fund KN (Korean national) employees for more than 30 days effective April 1, 2020," the memo reads.
In the memo, the USFK also delineated steps to be taken without a new SMA in place between the allies. Those steps include issuing proposed furlough notices to impacted employees by Jan. 31, 2020, issuing furlough decision notices to them by Feb. 28 and commencing furloughs of the employees on April 1...
"This memo officially informs you of the potential to furlough appropriated fund KN (Korean national) employees for more than 30 days effective April 1, 2020," the memo reads.
In the memo, the USFK also delineated steps to be taken without a new SMA in place between the allies. Those steps include issuing proposed furlough notices to impacted employees by Jan. 31, 2020, issuing furlough decision notices to them by Feb. 28 and commencing furloughs of the employees on April 1...
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20191202002300325?section=features/features
Best wishes to the 12,500 South Korean workers who directly support our forces in South Korea.