The new W76-2 low-yield Trident submarine warhead and North Korea?

Last edited Sun Feb 16, 2020, 12:49 AM - Edit history (1)

William Arkin, one of the authors of the FAS article on the new “tactical” warhead on a strategic nuclear missile (which doesn’t make any sense) appeared on the Democracy Now program. He made it clear the new nuclear weapon is more likely to be targeted at North Korea or Iran.* Firing such a weapon at Russia makes no sense at all. Arkin explores the convoluted logic of theories related to such a limited nuclear attack on Russian targets in the article.

*US Deploys New Low-Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead
Posted on Jan.29, 2020 in Nuclear Weapons, Russia, United States by Hans M. Kristensen
By William M. Arkin* and Hans M. Kristensen
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/01/w76-2deployed/

It's quite likely that a target of the new "tactical" nuclear warhead on the submarine launched ballistic missile is North Korea. The weapon appears to be specifically designed to destroy a deeply hardened target in a tactical environment. The US conventional military tactic of “decapitation” of North Korean leadership has been discussed openly in South Korean media in recent years. It never seemed practical, a special operations tactic to resolve a strategic problem.*

*Shin In-Kyun describes North Korean attack scenarios, May 1, 2019
https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2019/05/shin-in-kyun-describes-north-korean.html

Some expert observers of North Korea regardless of their political persuasion regarded the "bloody nose," or any conventional military attack on North Korea as completely "off the table." Potentially, the new Trident low yield nuclear weapon is being deployed for the same decapitation mission. Yet, it looks as if the new Trident warhead would elicit the very response from North Korea that it's use is allegedly designed to preclude, a barrage of ballistic missiles on friendly targets. The unreasonable response one could anticipate from the North Korea leadership, in reaction to a limited "tactical" nuclear attack by the US wouldn’t conform, to the logic or illogic if you prefer, of US nuclear game theory. Coincidentally, authoritative sources emphasized that the US carrier strike force recently deployed to the Indo-Pacific had an ABM mission as there are multiple aegis equipped surface warships associated with the carrier.*

*Korean focus on Carrier Strike Group deployment? Jan. 23, 2020
https://civilizationdiscontents.blogspot.com/2020/01/korean-focus-on-carrier-strike-group.html

Additionally, General John E. Hyten, Vice Chairman, JCS, made a widely circulated public statement about that time that he had 100 percent confidence in the strike force’s ability to deal with North Korean missile threats. The presentation of a potential first strike by a low yield nuclear weapon combined with a highly effective ABM capability suggests in the case of North Korea, a scenario, where a first strike, such as a decapitation strike, could be undertaken with confidence, if not impunity. This is not the case, because the irregular trajectories and terminal guidance of several of the North Korean short range ballistic missiles fired last year presented detection and tracking problems for the US, South Korea and Japan. This was the observation of media military and intelligence analysts in South Korea, which exacerbated concerns about the temporary South Korean withdrawal from GSOMIA, an intelligence sharing agreement among the three countries directed exactly at just such a threat. For those who may consider discussion of this scenario off base, keep in mind recent events involving the assassination of General Soleimani, which was a type of decapitation mission, and then the apparent absence of any effective defense against the subsequent Iranian ballistic missile barrage. These nominally unrelated events reflect national security thinking in Washington, D.C. and are intended to convey a message to North Korea.

In any case, if one were to consider the response from North Korea due to a “decapitation” attack with a small yield weapon like the W-76-2, let’s assume it succeeds with the precision and accuracy the new weapons are believed to have. Then in the aftermath of such an attack there remains a nuclear armed North Korea with unknown military commanders in unknown bunkers deciding what the response, if any, should be. Perhaps following US game theory they would decline to escalate the nuclear conflict. Or perhaps they wouldn’t. On the other hand, if the location of the bunker, or Kim Jong Un, was not precisely ascertained, and consequently the chairman or his successor survived, even for only for a brief time, a question arises about what would happen at that point. If one considers the desperation of the moment, the uncertainty, the confusion, and the likelihood of total destruction at the hands of the US military's vastly superior nuclear forces, what is the likely reaction of the North Korean leader? This thought arises, “Even though futilely suicidal, would he not respond in kind with nuclear armed ballistic missiles capable of reaching US bases in the region, where US and allied forces and command and control elements were plainly vulnerable?” Is this not in fact, exactly what would occur, given the ideological basis of North Korean communist doctrine and its self conscious role as the sacrificial victim of great power imperialism? Does the current deployment of US anti-ballistic missile forces in the region really give 100 percent assurance that this wouldn't be an effective response?

Conclusion, a “decapitation” attack with a “smaller” tactical nuclear warhead by the US would likely eventuate in a series of nuclear weapons detonating in the region.