Jack William Bell
@jackwilliambell@rustedneuron.com

Why don't people believe in Scientific Studies? A scientific study…

> Knowledge overconfidence is associated with anti-consensus views on controversial scientific issues. https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abo0038

#HumanCondition #science #psychology #stupid

Knowledge overconfidence is associated with anti-consensus views on controversial scientific issues


NICHOLAS LIGHT HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0003-4703-1026 , PHILIP M. FERNBACH, NATHANIEL RABB HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0002-7283-2549, MUGUR V. GEANA HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0002-1541-4746, AND STEVEN A. SLOMAN HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0001-8223-3788Authors Info & Affiliations

SCIENCE ADVANCES
20 Jul 2022 Vol 8, Issue 29 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.abo0038



Abstract


Public attitudes that are in opposition to scientific consensus can be disastrous and include rejection of vaccines and opposition to climate change mitigation policies. Five studies examine the interrelationships between opposition to expert consensus on controversial scientific issues, how much people actually know about these issues, and how much they think they know. Across seven critical issues that enjoy substantial scientific consensus, as well as attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccines and mitigation measures like mask wearing and social distancing, results indicate that those with the highest levels of opposition have the lowest levels of objective knowledge but the highest levels of subjective knowledge. Implications for scientists, policymakers, and science communicators are discussed.

INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty is inherent to science. A constant striving toward a better understanding of the world requires a willingness to amend or abandon previous truths, and disagreements among scientists abound. Sometimes, however, evidence is so consistent, overwhelming, or clear that a scientific consensus forms. Despite consensus by scientific communities on a handful of critical issues, many in the public maintain anti-consensus views. For example, there are sizable gaps in agreement between scientists and laypeople on whether genetically modified (GM) foods are safe to eat, climate change is due to human activity, humans have evolved over time, more nuclear power is necessary, and childhood vaccines should be mandatory (1). The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic also continues on, fueled in part by contagion among the unvaccinated (2), while social movements against vaccination policies are emerging worldwide. The consequences of these anti-consensus views are dire, including property destruction, malnutrition, disease, financial hardship, and death (3–6).

Opposition to the scientific consensus has often been attributed to nonexperts’ lack of knowledge, an idea referred to as the “deficit model” (7, 8). According to this view, people lack specific scientific knowledge, allowing attitudes from lay theories, rumors, or uninformed peers to predominate. If only people knew the facts, the deficit model posits, then they would be able to arrive at beliefs more consistent with the science. Proponents of the deficit model attempt to change attitudes through educational interventions and cite survey evidence that typically finds a moderate relation between science literacy and pro-consensus views (9–11). However, education-based interventions to bring the public in line with the scientific consensus have shown little efficacy, casting doubt on the value of the deficit model (12–14). This has led to a broadening of psychological theories that emphasize factors beyond individual knowledge. One such theory, “cultural cognition,” posits that people’s beliefs are shaped more by their cultural values or affiliations, which lead them to selectively take in and interpret information in a way that conforms to their worldviews (15–17). Evidence in support of the cultural cognition model is compelling, but other findings suggest that knowledge is still relevant. Higher levels of education, science literacy, and numeracy have been found to be associated with more polarization between groups on controversial and scientific topics (18–21). Some have suggested that better reasoning ability makes it easier for individuals to deduce their way to the conclusions they already value [(19) but see (22)]. Others have found that scientific knowledge and ideology contribute separately to attitudes (23, 24).

Recently, evidence has emerged, suggesting a potentially important revision to models of the relationship between knowledge and anti-science attitudes: Those with the most extreme anti-consensus views may be the least likely to apprehend the gaps in their knowledge. In a series of studies on opposition to GM foods, Fernbach et al. (25) found that individuals most opposed were the least knowledgeable about science and genetics but rated their understanding of the technology the highest in the sample. A similar pattern emerged for gene therapy, although not for climate change denial. Related findings have been reported for opponents of vaccination claiming to know more than doctors about autism (26) and for anti-establishment voters in a Dutch referendum reporting knowing more about the issues than they really do (27). Those with the most strongly held anti-consensus views may be not only the least knowledgeable but also the most overconfident about how much they know (28, 29).