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Colorado’s law does not implicate any recognized exception to the Court’s usual First Amendment rules. It does not require disclosure of “factual, noncontroversial information in . . . ‘commercial speech,’ ”id., at 768, and as applied to Ms. Chiles, it does not regulate conduct in a way that only “incidentally burden[s] speech,” id., at 769. All she does is speak, and speech is all Colorado seeks to regulate. Colorado’s argument that the law regulates speech only incidentally fails because the Court’s speech-incident-to-conduct doctrine asks whether the law restricts speech only because it is integrally related to unlawful conduct, or whether the law restricts expressive conduct only for reasons unrelated to its content. Colorado’s law does neither: Ms. Chiles’s speech does not bear a close causal connection to any separately unlawful conduct, and the State’s law trains directly on the content of her speech, permitting some viewpoints but not others.

(c) Colorado cannot establish that applying its law to Ms. Chiles falls within a long tradition of permissible content regulation.